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Each year the United States suffers approximately 3,000 fire-related deaths and 
approximately 4,700 work-related deaths. Hundreds of additional fatalities occur 
annually due to severe weather, as well as manmade and natural disasters. The specific 
research question addressed by these sobering statistics is: Can the general public be 
taught to save themselves during emergencies and disasters? To that end, the research 
answered the following questions: 1. What research has been previously performed to 
examine civilian survivability? 2. What are the cognitive functions that allow or prohibit 
people in making correct life-saving decisions? 3. Are there patterns to the way that 
people process information and perceive danger? 4. What are the critical elements that 
allow some people to survive and others to perish? 5. What can be done to increase the 
chances that civilians will make the correct choice of action during emergencies and 
disasters? 
Through descriptive research, the purpose was to examine and reveal the 
importance of human behavior and to produce recommendations that may help reduce 
fatalities. The literature review found an abundance of material available to address the 
topic. As heuristics (science of trial and error), utility theory (methodical evaluation of 
alternative choices), human reactions, such as fear, intuition, emotion, and past 
experience, and group versus individual dynamics each impact the decision-making 
process, the research concluded that the general public can be taught how to perform and 
react appropriately during emergencies. The recommendations included legislating 
mandatory training on emergency action plans in the workplace, enhance the efforts of 
emergency responders in public education, and develop public/private partnerships to 
provide realistic information and scenario-based drills that the public can comprehend 
and participate in. 
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The need to reduce human fatalities during emergencies and disasters has been 
acknowledged for centuries. Due to several major fires and tremendous losses of life and 
property in the 1800s and early 1900s, in 1925—commemorating the 40th anniversary of 
the Great Chicago Fire—President Calvin Coolidge declared the first Fire Prevention 
Week in the U.S. In his proclamation, he noted that during the preceding year alone, there 
were 15,000 U.S. fire deaths, and the majority of those deaths were preventable (United 
States Fire Administration, 2011a). However, it was not until the late 1960s that some of 
the most robust scientific research looked at the correlation between human behavior, 
emergencies, and fire fatalities, and how to reduce them (Corbitt, Given, Martin, Rhame, 
& Stone, 1967; Latane & Darley, 1968). 
The general research problem to be addressed is: Why do some people live and 
some people die in the same or similar emergencies and disasters? In addition, more 
specifically, can the general public be taught to save themselves? The purpose of the 
research is to examine and reveal the importance of human behavior and, in 
circumstances where they are applicable, use those behavioral characteristics to help 
reduce fatalities. Through descriptive research, this paper will answer the following 
questions: 
1.  What research has been previously performed to examine civilian 
survivability? 
2.  What are the cognitive functions that allow or prohibit people in making 
correct life-saving decisions? 
3.  Are there patterns in the way people process information and perceive 
danger? 
4.  What critical elements allow some people to survive and others to die? 
5.  What can be done to increase the chances that civilians will make the 
correct choice of action during emergencies and disasters? 
By answering these questions this research will help expand the realm of civilian 
survivability during emergencies and disasters. It will add to the current scientific 
knowledge on the subject and highlight the examination of several catastrophes of which 
there is a never-ending abundance. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
A. BACKGROUND 
According to the Fire Department, City of New York’s (FDNY’s) “Annual 
Report” (Fire Department, City of New York, 2012a): The FDNY, now in its 149th year, 
currently consists of 13,719 Fire Officers, Firefighters, Emergency Medical Technicians, 
Paramedics, and Fire Marshals. These highly trained individuals are buttressed by 1,649 
civilian support and trade personnel. The FDNY protects the lives and property of over 8 
million residents and 50.5 million estimated annual travelers who visit the city’s 322 
square miles for work, vacation, and entertainment (New York City & Company, 2011).  
The mission of the FDNY is to “Fight Fires, Save Lives and Minimize Property 
Damage, Provide Pre-Hospital Emergency Medical Services, Prepare for Terrorism, 
Investigate Cause and Origin of Fires, Enforce New York City (NYC) Public Safety 
Codes, Conduct Fire Safety Presentations and Events” (FDNY, 2011, p. 4). 
From July 1, 2011, through June 31, 2012 (which is the FDNY’s fiscal year 
2012), the FDNY responded to 488,256 fires, including 25,254 structural fires. The 
FDNY also responded to 206,783 non-fire emergencies (such as water/water craft 
rescues, severe weather emergencies, elevators entrapments, utility emergencies, building 
collapses, technical rescue, hazardous material incidents, auto accident victim 
extrications, etc.) and 1,497,077 emergency medical calls—including 461,830 
imminently life-threatening emergencies (e.g., respiratory/cardiac arrest, severe trauma, 
and/or burn injuries) (see Figure 1). Although there were 66 fire fatalities in New York 
City, representing the lowest in the city’s/FDNY’s recorded history (see Figure 2) 
(FDNY, 2012b), the FDNY was directly responsible for the saving or rescuing of 48,965 




Figure 1.  FDNY Vital Statistics 2011–2012 
 
Figure 2.  Historical 20-Year Trend of New York City Civilian Fire Fatalities 
Additionally, in 2011/2012 under its public education responsibilities the FDNY 
provided 7,098 fire safety programs; conducted 27 neighborhood fatal fire informational 
campaigns; distributed 15,575 smoke detectors and 95,014 smoke/carbon-monoxide 
detector batteries; and trained 10,243 civilians in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
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(FDNY, 2012a). The FDNY was also the supporting agency in the education of over 
1,500 volunteers, representing all five boroughs in the New York City Community 
Emergency Response Team (NYC CERT) Program. 
The NYC CERT program trains civilians as part of an organized team to assist 
first responders during large-scale disasters and emergencies. CERT volunteers play an 
important role in community events and preparedness training. In 2011, CERT volunteers 
assisted at the World Police and Fire Games, the second-largest multi-sport event in the 
world. CERT volunteers also assisted family members of the victims involved in a fatal 
Bronx bus accident in March 2011 that killed 15 passengers and seriously injured 7 
others, and helped staff evacuation shelters during Hurricane Irene in August 2011 (New 
York City Office of Emergency Management [NYC OEM], 2011). 
To help educate New York City residents in preparing for emergencies and 
disasters, (OEM’s) Ready New York Program has trained over 40,000 people, provided 
800,000 Ready New York Emergency and Disaster Preparedness Guides and spent 
$2.6 million in public disaster awareness and preparedness training, and multimedia ad 
campaigns (NYC OEM, 2011). 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the above background in relation to this thesis is the 
presumption that through the FDNY’s life-saving performance and the educational 
deliverables provided by the City of New York in general, the city’s OEM particularly, 
and the FDNY specifically, the numbers of civilians killed and injured in local 
emergencies and disasters may have been much greater had these preparedness inroads 
and educational outreach programs not been in place. Admittedly, the gauging or 
predicting of such a generality—which is far beyond the realm of this paper—may be 
difficult to prove. However, it is the lack of education nationally that may leave civilians 
at a significant disadvantage in their decision making when confronted by emergencies 
and disasters, which is the crux of this research.  
 
 6 
This thesis will explore previous published works and scientific research 
performed to examine human survivability. Particularly, the research will examine the 
roles and relationships that heredity, intuition, and education may play in human life-and-
death decision making. Acknowledging the long-standing debate about heredity versus 
environment and to what extent we are shaped by our everyday environmental 
experiences, the research will examine to what extent human behavior is a product of 
instincts and natural abilities, and to what extent it is based on learning, or learned 
behaviors.  
The relevance of this thesis to both the author and to the homeland security 
enterprise is to examine previous works and produce recommendations that will 
ultimately result in the saving of lives during emergencies and disasters.  
1. Deconstructing a Disaster 
Perhaps one of the earliest published systematic analysis of human behavior in a 
disaster was written in 1920 by Samuel H. Prince. After witnessing a devastating cargo 
ship explosion that destroyed Halifax, Nova Scotia—killing 1,963 and injuring over 
9,000 (22% of the city’s population)—Prince deconstructed the explosion for his Ph.D. 
dissertation. Although the majority of Prince’s work surrounds the context of social 
change and the rebuilding of Halifax after the disaster, it is his early recognition of 
human behavior during the event that is significant to this research. What he discovered 
was that human disaster personalities can be quite different from what we would expect. 
Prince (1920) offers the first evidence against the theory of individual role abandonment 
(people acting out of their normal routines) during a crisis and elaborates on the theory of 
“collective behavior” (years later described as “group think”) (p. 17). 
2. Panic, Hysteria and Savage Instincts 
Although he witnessed incidents of “savagery,” “thievery” (Prince, 1920, p. 50) 
and “pillaging” (p. 121), it was the acts of cooperation and organization during the initial 
rescue efforts that apply to this research. According to Prince, in the face major 
destruction in Halifax, there was a “lack of preparedness and governmental response” 
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(pp. 31, 64). Prince writes that this lack of governmental leadership left the populous 
“stunned and on their own for almost the entire first day” (p. 64).  
Many of Prince’s theories of “group reaction; hysteria; primitive instinct and 
savagery” (pp. 36–40), together with his documented accounts of “human phenomena of 
hallucination; delusion; primitive instincts” (pp. 35–36) and “flight for self-preservation” (pp. 
40, 50), have been debunked by later research. However, he was the first to attempt to tackle 
such a “virgin field of sociology” (p. 13). He was also one of the first to document first-hand 
accounts of human acts of omission and commission (p. 40) as contributing to the scope of 
the disaster and perhaps many of the resulting fatalities. 
Although “panic, hysteria and savage instinctive tendencies are what most people 
conjure up when they think of the word disaster” (Ripley, 2008), the reality can be quite 
different. It does not mean that the occurrences of these reactions are “not known, it just 
means that maybe we haven’t been looking in the right places” (p. x). Perhaps, as this 
research will endeavor to delineate, we tend to look at isolated individual behavior rather 
than at the behavior of the masses. 
3. Human Disaster Studies: A Languishing Science 
According to Ripley (2008), after Prince’s death the field of human disaster 
studies languished up until the start of the cold war, often dated from 1947 (“Fast Chess,” 
2011), when the threat of nuclear proliferation and the fear of mass casualties were 
omnipresent. After the fall of communism in 1991 (“Fast Chess,” 2011), Ripley believes 
that “…this field of study again waned—that is, until September 11, 2001” (p. ix). 
However, the research conducted for this thesis discovered that during the 1970s 
and 1980s Kahneman and Tverskry published many papers on human decision making. 
They explained that people make decisions based on emotional shortcuts and cognitive 
intuition first, and look for information to solidify their decisions second (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Based on earlier studies of Utility Theory, Kahneman and 
Tversky (Kahneman, Diener, & Schartz, 1999) applied this “methodological evaluation 
of alternatives choices and the satisfaction that each choice provides to the decision 
maker” to their study of “Hedonic psychology,” which is: 
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… the study of what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant. 
This concept is concerned with feelings of pleasure and pain, of interest 
and boredom, of joy and sorrow, and of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It 
is also accounts for a whole range of circumstances, from the biological to 
the societal, that alter suffering and enjoyment. (p. ix) 
The resulting research of Kahneman and Tversky concluded with their theory of 
“heuristics.” In short, heuristics is the science of trial and error. They explained that 
people rely on emotional shortcuts to make themselves feel safe and happy, even though, 
based on presented facts, those feelings may be irrational and produce predictable errors 
(1982). To explain the mistakes that people make when estimating the effects of different 
scenarios on their future happiness, people tend to conjure up illusions to assist in 
considering the impact of one specific behavior over another. According to Kahneman 
and Tversky people tend to greatly exaggerate the importance of those illusional factors 
while overlooking the numerous and more obvious factors that would, in most cases, 
have a greater impact on their decisions, thus increasing uncertainty and producing more 
shortcuts.  
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s studies examining fear and human 
reaction to disasters started to appear. Many of those publications grew out of several 
large-scale and well-documented disasters. Concentrating on the human aspects of those 
events greatly propelled the examination of civilian survivability and decision making. 
4. Cognitive Functions 
To learn if there are cognitive functions that allow or prohibit people to make 
correct life-saving decisions, this research will look at several publications on the topic. 
According to Ripley (2008), “about 90% of Americans live in areas that are at significant 
risk of earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or targets for terrorism” (p. xvi). In 
drawing on such a statistic, Ripley proposes that it is very likely that each one of us in 




DeBecker (1997) believes that we all are qualified to answer life’s highest-stakes 
question—will I live or die? Gonzales (2003) adds “that we can use evolutionary history 
and survival instincts to overcome the hazards of everyday life” (p. 44). Ripley (2008) 
disagrees. She feels that evolution can actually hurt us or let us down, mainly due to her 
conjecture that evolution has been unable to keep pace with our daily ever-changing 
world.  
Ripley (2008) argues that the cognitive functions that allow or prohibit people 
from making correct life-saving decisions may just be an instinctual response. However, 
rather than relying on instincts, this research has determined that definitive action must be 
a conscious process during emergencies. Intuition and emotion may lead to incorrect 
choices and irrational behavior; therefore, individuals must make quick decisions based 
on an acknowledgement of how things are and not what they would like them to be.  
5. It’s All About Perception 
Asking if there are patterns to the way people process information and perceive 
danger, the research supports the premise that people who survive disasters generally do 
not see themselves as victims (Gonzales, 2003).  
Gonzales (2008) contends that humans work from mental scripts that we have 
been putting together in our memory banks from the second we emerged from the womb. 
These pattern judgments take time and, as Kahneman and Tversky (1982, 1999) found, 
can be misleading at best.  
6. Death, Dying and Phases 
Ripley (2008) offers that the phases of people processing information start with 
disbelief, followed by frantic deliberation (using mind scripts, utility theory and heuristics), 
and finally taking action (p. 7). Throughout her book, she refers to these phases as the 
Survival Arc. DeBecker (1997) agrees. He writes that animals must rely on intuition to 
survive in the wild because they lack the ability to reason. Animals do not get distracted as 
people do. Therefore, animalistic patterns of processing information and initiating action may 
be more pure as compared to that of humans. That is, animals run first and reason second.  
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As final proof of the patterns used by people to process and perceive danger, we 
look at Pan (2006). Pan contends that individual decision-making processes in 
emergencies are based on instinct, experience, and bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality is in essence the understanding that, first, individuals may make judgment 
errors, and second, human behavior may deviate from the precepts of expected norms (p. 
25). As previously introduced, there potentially exists several patterns that people use to 
process information and perceive danger. However, Pan’s bounded rationality theory 
appears to be one that satisfactorily answers the research question: Can the public be 
taught to save themselves during emergencies and disasters? According to Pan, they can, 
but only if the public sees presented facts for what they really are and not as they 
perceive them to be.  
7. Fear Versus Panic 
If there are critical elements that allow some people to survive and others to 
perish, fear is certainly a critical element that may help or hurt people in emergencies. 
DeBecker (1997) describes fear as a “survival signal” that only sounds in the perceived 
presence of danger. He bases his book on the assumption that if people can learn to 
predict violent behaviors and imminent risk by paying attention to subtle and sometimes 
blatant clues of fear and intuition, they may be able to avoid becoming a victim. On the 
other hand, he adds that fear and intuition are “inevitably linked within the human 
psyche” (p. 7). 
Ripley (2008) writes that “fear is instinctual and primitive to human beings and so 
are our reactions to it” (p. 43). However, this research has found that while fear is 
instinctual, how we react to it is based on perception. Therefore, our individual values 
and attitudes toward fear will determine our behavior. The research suggests that we may 
be able to use fear to make decisions rather than just react to it. Regarding fear as a 
critical element, Gonzales (2008) suggests that behavioral scripts or mental models may 
keep our mind closed. These scripts will then allow us to “ignore or discount new 
information” (p. 27). DeBecker (1997) writes that fear is different from panic, worry, or 
anxiety. Real fear, he says, initiates action (p. 285). On the other hand, panic, worry, and 
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anxiety make us pause and think rather than react. Moreover, according to DeBecker, that 
can be deadly (p. 285). As a critical element of the basic premises of this research, he 
points out that that panic, worry and anxiety are a choice (p. 285). 
Another critical element that may allow people to survive or perish is the 
recognition of the effects of group think. Pan (2006) refers to what is now widely 
regarded as group think as “social inhibition” (p. 30). This occurs when individuals first 
turn to each other for social cues rather than taking action. Gonzales (2008) writes that 
group think often leads us into a false sense of reality (p. 93). Other aspects of group 
think as critical elements of survival are presented by Winerman (2004), and they 
include: the tendency not to evacuate immediately when a fire alarm sounds; unrealistic 
panic versus calmness within group settings; people stopping to assist others; the 
tendency to exit through the same door entered; and the fact that humans are inertia-
driven and do not like to stop what they’re doing or even acknowledge an emergency that 
they perceive to be an inconvenience (p. 1).  
C. CONCLUSION 
This research has addressed the general research question: Can the general public 
be taught to save themselves during emergencies and disasters? The overwhelming 
evidence found throughout the research is that yes, they can. Therefore, the thesis 
argument has been developed around the notion that learning is vitally important to 
civilian survivability, and may be able to overcome inherent human abilities. A greater 
emphasis on education and training of the public is an integral component of the thesis 
recommendations. 
If people learn to acknowledge and act on fear rather than react to it, and if they 
can be taught to adapt to what is happening in the now–rather than spending time wishing 
the situation was how they’d like it to be–then more lives would be saved. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The need to reduce human fatalities during emergencies and disasters has been 
acknowledged for centuries. Due to several major fires and tremendous losses of life and 
property in the early 1800s and early 1900s, in 1925—commemorating the 40th 
anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire—President Calvin Coolidge declared the first Fire 
Prevention Week in the U.S. In his proclamation, he noted that during the preceding year 
alone, there were 15,000 U.S. fire deaths, the majority of which were preventable. 
(USFA, 2011a) However, it was not until the late 1960s that some of the earliest 
scientific research began to look at the correlation between human behavior, emergency 
and fire fatalities, and how to reduce them (Corbitt, Given, Martin, Rhame, & Stone, 
1967; Latane & Darley, 1968).  
This literature review will strive to examine relevant sources to determine if 
people can be taught to save themselves during emergencies and disasters. According to 
Ripley (2008), nine out of every 10 Americans (or 90%) live in areas that are at 
significant risk of earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or targets for terrorism  
(p. xvi). It may appear that such a statistic might engender each of us to make haste in 
protecting ourselves, our loved ones, and our property. However, as the literature reveals, 
most often that is not the case. 
A. WHAT WE KNOW 
What we know is that annually, the U.S. suffers an average of over 3,000 fire 
deaths (USFA, 2011b), and over 4,600 workplace fatalities (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2012). Additionally, although no exact statistical number could be found, it was readily 
acknowledged throughout the research process that hundreds of additional deaths occur 
in the U.S. every year due to severe weather, and both manmade and natural disasters. So, 
why are these death tolls so high? As Ripley (2008) asks: “Is there something that 
happens in our brains to make us react in certain ways? Are we culturally conditioned to 
risk our lives for strangers? Or, are we evolutionarily programmed to freeze in 
emergencies?” (p. xi). According to Gonzales (2003), 75% of people caught in a 
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catastrophe either freeze or simply wander about in a daze (p. 38). Therefore, what makes 
the other 25%—those who survive—so special? Is it luck? Not according to Ripley. She 
states that luck is, at best, unreliable, and that we have more control over our fate than we 
think; we just need to stop underestimating ourselves (2008, p. xvii). 
The literature supports the premise that the people who survive disasters generally 
do not see themselves as victims, nor do they waste time and energy complaining about 
the bad things that have happened or are happening to them (Gonzales, 2008). In 
summary, the literature reviewed for this research suggests that people can be taught how 
to act in emergencies. However, the issue of controlling emotions and acknowledging 
human thought processes may be difficult for the general public to comprehend.  
B. WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW 
DeBecker (1997) laments that we all are qualified to answer life’s highest-stakes 
question—will I live or die? Gonzales (2003) adds that we humans work from mental 
scripts that we have been putting together in our memory banks from the second we 
emerged from the womb. Thus, he feels, we can use evolutionary history and survival 
instincts to overcome the hazards of everyday life (p. 44). Ripley (2008) disagrees. She 
feels that evolution can actually hurt us or let us down, mainly due to her conjecture that 
evolution has been unable to keep pace with our daily ever-changing world. Further, 
Ripley believes that risk may be too complex for humans to understand. In our world’s 
current state of “Extremistan” (an environment where huge, unpredictable events [viz. 
“Black Swans”] can happen to anyone, anywhere [Nassin, 2010, p. 34]), “the value 
placed on old tricks to overcome new challenges simply do not work” (Ripley, 2008, p. 
27).  
Gonzales (2003) contends that we are born as generalists and we are curious 
about everything. Then, as we grow older and learn, we become more of a specialist with 
varying degrees of narrowed focus (p. 14). Generalization, he says, “enables us to keep a 
broad range of knowledge that may assist us when danger or disaster strikes” (p. 15). 
Likening this concept to the daily drudgery of workers in high-rise office buildings, their 
daily routine takes them through the lobbies of their buildings to the elevator. The 
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elevator doors open, they step in, turn around, face front, and look up. Why do we do 
that? There is no rule or law that requires such a practice. There are no lessons in elevator 
usage that teaches it, yet we all do it. Is this human conditioning? Or, is it group think 
mentality (which we will discuss later)? When the elevator reaches the desired floor the 
doors open and the worker goes to his or her desk/office/cubicle and begins to work. 
When it is break time or at the conclusion of his or her work day they follow the same 
routine in reverse. This researcher has always been amazed by how many of these 
workers have no idea where the exit stairways are, nor do they think about it. Most of 
them never even pay attention to the “you are here signs” that remind (and show) them 
where the stairs are to use in case of emergency. That is why the first two things flight 
attendants do on an airplane are: Make sure your seatbelt is securely fastened and make 
note of the nearest emergency exits! This is the narrowing of human focus as previously 
introduced by Gonzales (2003). He also believes that modern society has made us “lazy 
and susceptible” to previously unknown threats (front inside cover). To combat those 
threats, Gonzales (2008) offers that “the tools of everyday survival are: curiosity, always 
seeking new information; awareness, knowing where one is physically and mentally at all 
times; and attention, noting the way things are and being open to change” (pp. 14–16).  
1. Fear Versus Panic 
While attributing fear to a “survival signal” that only sounds in the perceived 
presence of danger, DeBecker (1997) bases his book on the assumption that if people can 
learn to predict violent behaviors and imminent risk by paying attention to subtle and 
sometimes blatant clues of fear and intuition, they may be able to avoid becoming a 
victim (p. 7).  
Expounding on the topic of fear, Ripley (2008) writes that fear is instinctual and 
primitive to human beings and so are our reactions to it (p. 43). Through hundreds of 
interviews with disaster survivors, several researchers describe how, in life-or-death 
situations, people gain certain powers and lose others. For instance, some survivors report 
perfect eyesight during the event and have no need to use their prescription glasses. 
Others have stated that their hearing became extra keen or other senses were heightened. 
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Still others have reported temporary blindness, loss of bowel and bladder control, and 
inability to speak. These are all inert survival instincts that have been instilled in us since 
the beginning of mankind (Ripley, 2008; Gonzales, 2003, 2008). 
DeBecker (1997), on the other hand, adds that fear and intuition are inevitably 
linked within the human psyche. He contends that what people believe they fear is rarely 
what they actually fear (pp. 281–283). As an example, he uses the analogy that a person 
falling is not fearful of falling, for that is already happening; what they fear is landing. 
DeBecker believes that we should embrace fear; first, because whatever we fear is not 
happening right now (that is a good thing), and second, we can use fear as the 
subconscious and innate signal that it is, and view it as one which we can act upon (p. 
283). DeBecker (1997) also believes that people are experts at predicting violent behavior 
and risks. He states that humans know when they’re in the presence of danger and that 
their use (or lack of use) of gut feelings result from a cognitive process that utilizes cues 
and clues that their mind has previously recognized (p. 7). Gonzales (2008) adds that the 
natural mechanisms that make humans behave the way they do, when coupled with the 
laws of physics and chemistry, bring about short- and long-term outcomes that we both 
enjoy and suffer through (p. 16). Gonzales further suggests that behavioral scripts or 
mental models may keep our mind closed. The familiar may lead us to perceive 
something as being familiar even though we have never come across it before. These 
scripts will then allow us to “ignore or discount new information” (2008, p. 27).  
So, if fear and mind scripts are all part of the human condition, how can we use 
them to help us survive? Ripley (2008) introduces a concept she calls the “Survival Arc”. 
This arc of human behavior is guided by fear. It is comprised of three separate stages: 
Denial (or disbelief), which Ripley contends is the most hideous of responses (p. 21); 
Deliberation (often accompanied by lethargy), which is greatly influenced by the group(s) 
that an individual associates with and dramatically influences his or her chance for 
survival; and the Decision (or Ah-Ha! moment), which forces humans into action, much 
the same as the fight-or-flight syndrome (p. 7). Similarly, Gonzales (2003) writes about 
phases experienced by people who are lost in the wilderness; (a) denial, (b) realization 
(with an accompanying frantic, unproductive urgency), (c) chemical emotion (the 
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forming of familiar and comforting mental maps), (d) deterioration (both rationally and 
emotionally), and finally (e) resignation–survival then requires the new formation of 
mental maps of how things really are in the present. Gonzales writes that to survive, “you 
must find yourself. Then it won’t matter where you are” (p. 157).  
Additionally, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2009) 
found that in building fires, the phases and factors that influence actions are specific to 
individual occupants within the building, the building structure and design layout, and the 
fire event with its associated toxic smoke and heat travel. NIST lists four phases of 
perception and action that influence behavioral processes in occupants (see Figure 3). 
Phase 1, the perception phase, occurs when building occupants can perceive (or receive) 
external physical and social cues from their environment, including such physical cues as 
flames, smoke, or debris, and such social cues as hearing discussion, seeing others’ action 
or inaction, or receiving phone calls from outside the building. During this phase, 
occupants can perceive more complex conditions and states, such as uncertainty, 
information overload, time pressure, and even their own thoughts or memories from past 
events. In Phase 2, the occupants attempt to interpret the information provided by the 
cues perceived during the previous phase. During this interpretation phase, occupants 
interpret or define both the situation (e.g., it is a false alarm or a serious fire) and the risk 
to themselves and/or to others. Phase 3 involves occupants making decisions on what to 
do next based on their interpretations of the situations and risks confronting them. And, 
finally, in Phase 4, occupants may perform the action that they decided upon in the 
previous decision-making phase (p. 6). 
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Figure 3.  The Behavioral Process of Occupant Response in a Building Fire 
Ripley’s Survival Arc, and Gonzales’ five general stages of being lost appear to 
be derived directly from the five stages of dying as described by Elizabeth Kubler-Ross 
(1969) in “On Death and Dying”: denial–anger–bargaining–depression–and acceptance. 
However, the less obvious relationship—which is vital to this research—and one 
sustained by the NIST’s four phases of behavioral processes, is that–many times during 
fires, emergencies, and disasters–the results are often the same.  
2. Emotions Versus Reason 
Ripley (2008) states that according to her research, generally in emergency 
situations, “human emotions trump reason” (p. 59). DeBecker (1997) agrees by writing 
that animals rely on intuition because, unlike humans, they lack the ability to reason. 
Animals do not get distracted as people do. They do not consider the way things could be, 
used to be, or should be; they perceive only what is now. Animals in the wild that are 
overcome with fear never spend mental energy or time thinking, “it’s probably nothing,” 
as people do (p. 30).  
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Ripley (2008) points out that the fallible hierarchy of fear is shaped like a triangle. 
At the apex of that triangle are over-confidence and underestimation of the risks at hand 
(p. 43). DeBecker (1997) counters that fear is different from panic, worry, or anxiety. 
Real fear, he says, initiates action (p. 285). Fear does not give action (or reaction) a 
second thought. Panic, worry and anxiety make us pause and think rather than react and 
that can be deadly. He claims, however, that panic, worry, and anxiety are a choice (p. 
285), and that anytime a dreaded outcome cannot be linked in our mind to pain or death, 
and that link is not a signal of the presence of danger, then it really shouldn’t be confused 
with fear (p. 285). DeBecker continues that worry is a fear humans manufacture and that 
anxiety is always caused by uncertainty and/or lack of communication (p. 291).  
Comparing panic and fear requires that we first differentiate the two. In 1981, 
Paulsen set out to do just that. He offers that panic has been used more than any other 
word to describe human behavior in fires (p. 10). Paulsen states that panic has been used 
to refer to actions that might be labeled operationally as “maladaptive or adaptive, 
rational or irrational,” depending on the outcome of the actions of those who survive a 
disaster (p. 11). He further argues that behavioral scientists have taken an unscientific 
word like panic and attached operational definitions to it (as described above). However, 
these actions or reactions are highly subjective. What may seem as irrational to an outside 
observer may actually be rational in the eyes of the participant. Paulsen offers this 
example: “Movement within a burning building against the press of an exiting crowd by a 
parent attempting to find a child is adaptive from the parent’s viewpoint, but maladaptive 
for the group of people trying to get out” (p. 11).  
Although panic has proved to be a poorly understood and an often overused word 
when it comes to describing human behavior in emergencies, fear, and its subsequent 
effects on individual human behavior, may be a much more definitive term. Although 
fear has several derivatives, it may also prove to offer more predictable human outcomes. 
Thus far in our analysis, we have seen that mindfulness—a fully present and 
heightened state of self-awareness (George, 2010)–contributes greatly to survival in 
emergencies and disasters. Next, we will relate mindfulness and intuition to individual 
and group survival.  
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C. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP SURVIVAL 
Keating and Loftus (1981) contend that fire deaths are usually seen as failures 
(usually on the part of individuals or systems) that threaten the predictability of our world 
(fires seem to appear out of nowhere). The impact is that we tend to dismiss accidental 
fire deaths as the victim’s fault (i.e., “they panicked”). It would appear from this vantage 
point that panic as a behavior may be an assumption, not a condition to be defined or one 
able to be verified. Panic may not necessarily preclude a person from taking appropriate 
life-saving actions in a given emergency. Fear, on the other hand, may be more 
measurable and therefore more accountable for human reaction or inaction during 
emergencies. In fact, this literature review has found that panic is very rarely seen in 
emergency scenarios and will be discussed under group actions. 
In his dissertation on human and social behaviors in emergencies, Pan (2006) 
contends that individual decision-making processes in emergencies are based on: instinct, 
experience, and bounded rationality (p. 25). He equates the fight-or-flight syndrome to 
fear based on an individual’s perception of extreme life-threatening situations. He also 
discusses that following experience is usually straightforward as humans can recognize a 
situation, retrieve routines in their memory and carry out those routines to what they 
believe will be a satisfactory conclusion (p. 26). Bounded rationality includes searching 
for possible answers, anticipating consequences, weighing each consequence against the 
other options, and finally choosing the most favorable option (p. 26). Likewise, these 
techniques of mindfulness can be used in the business world and the high-stakes world of 
emergency services (George, 2010). 
1. Intuition, Business Moguls and Firefighting Commanders 
Breen (2000) on trusting instincts states: “One of the prime tools in rapid decision 
making is mental simulation—the ability to evaluate a course of action by imagining how 
it may unfold and may ultimately play out” (p. 295). According to Breen, when it comes 
to making decisions and intuition in business you must trust your instincts. Similarly, 
Campbell (2000) writes that intuition is a tool that we all have, and if nurtured, intuition 
and gut feelings can boost sales, close deals, and make better hiring decisions. 
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Confidence in one’s intuitive abilities is especially important when a decision must be 
made under deadlines without necessary facts (Campbell, 2000). Similarly, George 
(2010) on discussing Mindful Leadership describes mindfulness as:  
...a state of being fully present, aware of oneself and other people, and 
sensitive to one’s reactions to stressful situations. Leaders who are 
mindful tend to be more effective in understanding and relating to others, 
and motivating them toward shared goals. Hence, they become more 
effective in leadership roles. (p. 2) 
In his book Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, Klein (1999), after a decade 
of following firefighters, military personnel, paramedics, doctors, nurses, and even chess 
champions in blitz games—defined as “a type of chess game where each side has 
significantly less time to make their moves [minutes] than in normal tournament time 
[hours]” (“Fast Chess,” 2009)—has scientifically documented how people make choices 
under severe time constraints, with limited information and constantly changing goals.  
2. Chess Problem Solving 
Problem solving in chess was an interesting, non-emergent comparison form of 
decision making found during the research. It was discovered that master chess players 
utilize heuristics, experience, and sometimes a “sixth sense” (or intuition) to beat their 
opponents (Grey, 2008). Because chess is arguably our most complex of human games 
(A. Moghaddam, personal communication, January 17, 2013) the decision-making 
process it requires is worth exploring. Rather than comparing the standard chess 
tournament time controls—where players have between 60 and 150 minutes per game 
(Fédération internationale des échecs [FIDE], 1990)—this research will concentrate on 
the blitz (or Fast, Lightning) games of chess due to the added stressors of limited time 
constraints in which players must make their moves quickly with only three to five 
minutes per play (“Fast Chess,” 2009). 
According to Grey (2008), the psychological strategy to winning in a blitz chess 
game is based on the fact that statistically, the game ends not by one of the sides 
checkmating, but rather by one of the players running out of time. Therefore, the main 
objective in a blitz chess game is to make the opponent lose valuable time thinking of the 
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next move, rather than gaining the upper hand on the board. In this blitz chess scenario, time 
pressure is an advantage, and not an obstacle. Of course, that is contrary to the case for 
humans in most emergencies and disasters. 
3. Complicate Rather Than Simplify?  
In his chess blog, Grey (2008) writes that most beginner blitz players try to swap 
out as many pieces as possible, thus clearing the board and simplifying the situation and 
the thinking process (for themselves). In addition, a swap is an easy move to spot, and the 
decision can be made extremely fast. However, more experienced players would rather 
make obscure moves, rather than taking this more simplistic approach. The obscure 
moves tend to complicate the situation and force the opponent to think of an original 
move, rather than a fast, reactive one. When a player threatens to capture an opponent’s 
piece, even when it is easily defended, the opponent must waste time to think of ways to 
protect it, thus losing precious seconds, possibly running out of time, and thereby losing 
the match. A threat to capture an opponent’s piece is both a simple move that does not 
require much thought, and an aggressive move that pressures the opponent to think 
(Grey, 2008). 
This is where the merging of blitz-style chess and this thesis applies. If the 
emergency and/or disaster can be thought of as the obscure player in the above blitz 
chess game, the extreme situation it presents oftentimes forces most people to stop and 
think (or come up with) an original move to save themselves. Conversely, if the 
individual facing the emergency or disaster can eliminate as many complications as 
possible (e.g., knowing where the emergency exits are, having an evacuation kit, 
familiarization with or having an emergency action plan in place, etc.) he or she will tend 
to “simplify” the situation and make quicker decisions. Thus, allowing more time to take 
action and win the ultimate “blitz” game of survival.  
4. Intuition Versus the Sixth Sense 
Intuition, says Klein (1999), is the driving force behind the ability to make 
decisions. Fire commanders use the same tactic. Instead of weighing many options, they 
make instinctive decisions and then compare them with alternatives. Klein also found that 
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once recognized, intuition can be developed and utilized to its fullest extent. While most 
decision-makers liken this to a “sixth sense” or “extrasensory perception” (ESP) (p. 37), 
Klein’s hypothesis suggests that it is just intuition based on a storehouse of experiences in 
the brain. Over time, both firefighters and civilians are able to subconsciously categorize 
fires and life lessons according to how they should react to them. Firefighters create one 
mental catalog that calls for a search for life and rescue, and another for fires that require 
an interior or exterior attack. Civilians do the same when they are driving their car and an 
object appears in front of them. Then both race through their memories in a “hyper-drive” 
(p. 261) search to find a prototypical fire or past experiences that resemble the fire or 
object they are currently facing. As soon as they recognize the right match, they swing 
into action (Klein, 1999).  
5. The Corporate World 
In the business world, Breen (2000) sees corporations that teach decision-making 
skills by insisting that their employees generate large lists of options may actually be 
slowing down the decision-making process. Klein (1999) refers to this as “analysis by 
paralysis” (p. 259). Newer employees may need to follow such a course of action because 
they need a framework to help them think through given issues. However, to get them 
past the beginner stage, organizations must “accelerate the growth of their experiences, so 
that they can rapidly accumulate the memories and cues that will enable them to make 
faster, better decisions” (Breen, 2000, p. 294). Breen suggests, “the more you know the 
faster you go” (p. 294) and therefore corporations offering newer employees mental 
simulations of problems that have occurred or may occur will help them develop rapid 
assessment skills. The faster an employee can compare different approaches and options, 
the faster they will be at solving problems. Senior employees, according to Breen, can 
move faster because they look at an issue, develop a plan, rapidly assess its feasibility 
based on past issues, and move on. They do not need to compare and contrast different 
approaches (Breen, 2000).  
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6. Emergency Services Versus the Corporate World 
The same holds true in the fire and emergency services, which rely on drills 
(performing tasks repetitiously), post-emergency critiques, and storytelling to assist 
newer members to grow in the decision-making process, thus providing them with more 
stored cognitive information than they have in actual experience (Klein, 1999). 
Therefore, the insights as presented by Breen (2000) and Campbell (2000) for the 
business community are also applicable to firefighters in risk-versus-reward analysis and 
the decisive actions required to save lives during structural fires, and civilians who must 
make quick decisions while driving a vehicle, for example.  
7. Rate the Options 
Klein (1999) describes a classic decision-making model where practitioners 
“identify options, compile and compare them, evaluate them, rate them, and then pick the 
option with the highest rating” (p. 4). With fire commanders, Klein concludes that time 
pressure simply doesn’t allow for application of this classic model. Split-second decision-
makers, according to Klein, are more likely to come up with one course of action (based 
on past experiences), and run through it mentally to look for flaws. If no flaws are found, 
they take decisive action. If they do find flaws, they come up with another possible 
course of action. However, they never compare the two options: “They simply don’t have 
the time or the energy” (p. 14).  
Klein calls this the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) making model (pp. 24–
25). In essence, fire commanders compare quickly (and often unconsciously) the situation 
they’re in with information stored in their mind—as a pseudo file drawer, Rolodex, or 
catalog system. They can then recognize features that are analogous to, or different from, 
these earlier experiences. This allows fire commanders to form accurate mental models 
and intuitive courses of action. Because of this, experience is extremely important in the 
split-second decision-making process. If one does not have the experience to fall back, 
one is more likely to follow the traditional and more time-consuming decision-making, 
model-gathering data and options, and comparing them (Klein, 1999). This would also 
apply to civilians driving their private vehicle. 
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8. How Do They Do It? 
Klein emphasizes that when asking decision makers how they did it, most 
answered that they simply drew from their experiences. However, he finds that 
experience is not a satisfactory answer. Revealing that battle-tested decision-makers are 
unable to explain how they make decisions, Klein states: “Their minds move so rapidly 
when they make high-pressure decisions, they can’t articulate how they did it. They can 
see what’s going on in front of them, but not behind them” (p. 90). Klein concluded that 
pressure-sensitive decision-makers, when confronted with a situation, often ask 
themselves, “What do I do,” not “What’s going on” (p. 127). Their experience buys them 
time—the ability to size up almost any given situation and to recognize the best course of 
action—rather than ESP. 
Klein feels that fire commanders who withdraw their troops just before a sudden 
and catastrophic structural collapse simply use “SP”—the sensory perception that 
detected subtle differences in details compared with other fires in the commander’s mind. 
Ultimately, according to Klein, “intuition is all about perception” and “the formal rules of 
decision making are almost incidental” (p. 93). He further believes that if everything 
works out OK, then fire commanders stick with their choice. However, if they discover 
unintended consequences that could get them in trouble, they discard that solution and 
look for another. They might run through several choices, but they never compare one 
option with another. They rapidly evaluate each choice on its own merits, even if they 
cycle through several possibilities. Fire commanders do not need the best solution or 
plan; they just need one that works (Klein, 1999).  
As previously cited in this thesis, other researchers do not feel that intuition is a 
practical or dependable way of making decisions for civilians in life-and-death 
emergencies because it may take them too long to take necessary action (Ripley, 2008; 
Gonzales, 2003, 2008; DeBecker, 1997). Learned behavior, as argued by this thesis, is a 
more reliable option in making better life-saving decisions. 
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9. Group Survival 
When it comes to group behavior and survival in emergencies, Pan (2006) refers 
to a term called “Social Inhibition” (p. 30). This phenomenon occurs when individuals 
first turn to each other for social cues and clues rather than taking definitive action. Pan 
states it is the fear of appearing foolishly hyper-excited over an event that may not be an 
emergency. The outcome, according to Pan, is the opposite of panic. Individuals within 
the group maintain a calm outward appearance while looking and judging others’ 
reactions. Leaders usually emerge, calling for action and others generally will fall in 
behind and follow as long as the leader remains calm and focused (p. 30).  
10. Failure Is Not an Option, Is It? 
According to DeBecker (1997) people are much more open to every cue and clue 
when they don’t focus on the expectation of specific (fear) signals received. Fear tends to 
make us hyper-alert, which usually decreases the likelihood of perceiving a hazard and 
thus reduces safety (p. 279). Gonzales writes that group think often leads us into a false 
sense of reality. He cites the Apollo 13 space mission, as well as the Challenger and 
Columbia space shuttle missions, as times where NASA’s group think mentality of 
“Failure is not an option” made personnel blind toward possible errors and acts of 
omission and commission that ended two of those three missions in disaster. Failure is 
always an option and humans must remain vigilant to stave off complacency. 
11. U.S. Versus U.K. 
Another aspect of group think/group survival is the classic myth that “people exit 
structures immediately when they hear a fire alarm” (Winerman, 2004, p. 1). It has been 
this researcher’s professional experience that Europeans tend to take fire alarms much 
more seriously than Americans do. Americans tend to want to define a situation before 
they respond to it. They will wait for more cues—such as the smell of smoke or a co-
worker urging them to leave—before they decide to take action. Perhaps this is due to the 
history of fires and manmade disasters (wars) suffered by the Europeans, particularly 
during World War II. Or, it may be a reaction to the numerous television and media ad 
campaigns over the years to educate the public as to what actions they should undertake 
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during an emergency, especially a fire. One of the most recognized ones can be seen at: 
http://youtube.com/watch?v=V5X-mO_WRkU.v Government websites provide 
information on a host of disaster preparedness situations, such as the U.K.’s: 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/HomeandCommunity/InYourHome/FireSafety/index.htm and 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/. Additionally, the U.K.’s Civil Contingencies Act of 
2004 requires that the public be informed about different types of emergency situations. 
Since the 1980s, the U.K. fire service has embraced public education focusing on 
schoolchildren. And finally, the coordinated and organized response by the U.K. fire 
service, local and national governments all sending out the same messages goes a long 
way in helping to educate the public (C. Hawkswell, personal communication, August 31, 
2012). 
Winerman (2004) debunks several myths regarding group evacuation and survival 
in her research, namely that people generally do not panic in emergencies, people are 
more often than not altruistic (helping strangers or those less able to help themselves), 
most people will attempt to exit through the same door they entered (usually because they 
have not identified other exits), people will move through smoke when necessary, and 
people are inertia creatures (they do not like to stop what they are doing and drop their 
everyday tasks to react or even acknowledge an emergency that can be distracting or an 
inconvenience) (pp. 1–2).  
12. Time To React 
A good example presented by Ripley (2008) is the May 1960 earthquake—the 
largest ever recorded in history—that occurred off the coast of Chile killing 2,230–6,000 
people. Hawaii’s automated tsunami sirens sounded 10 hours before the island was hit. 
The technology and plan worked, yet 64 Hawaiians perished. Most people who heard the 
sirens did not know what they meant and waited for more information and clues from 
their neighbors and relatives rather than evacuating. In March 2011, a similar yet much 
less powerful tsunami struck Hawaii after an earthquake in Japan. The waves only 
reached heights of 39 inches. However, the revised evacuation plan and warnings were 
taken seriously along the island chain’s coast, and there were no fatalities as citizens 
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immediately fled to higher ground. Additionally, a study conducted by the NIST (2002) 
concluded that on September 11, 2001, survivors waited on average six minutes before 
they began evacuating the World Trade Center (WTC). Internationally, building 
architects and engineers were astounded that the estimated 17,410 people who evacuated 
the WTC took about one minute per floor to climb down (that’s the same estimation they 
used for firefighters—carrying over 215 lbs. of gear—would take to climb up), which 
was twice as long as predicted and adopted in the standard building codes of that time.  
Likewise, a study of occupant behavior during a high-rise office building fire 
(NIST, 2010) found that the actions of occupants (e.g., waiting for information, helping 
others, and evacuation preparation actions) were main factors that significantly increased 
pre-evacuation times (p. 2). Additionally, the NIST research determined that certain 
actions (e.g., searching for information and confirming information about an incident) 
have been linked as ones that actually increase pre-evacuation delays (p. 4). As this 
literature review discovered in Gonzales (2003, 2008) and Kahneman et al. (1982, 1999), 
NIST acknowledges that an occupant’s perception of risk, a factor that occurs in relation 
to the incident (identified as an “incident factor”), decreases the occupant’s overall pre-
evacuation time (p. 4). 
The above examples and literature review illustrate how professional architects 
and engineers, like so many civilians, have no concept of how quickly fires and natural 
emergencies can progress and how short time is when an urgent need to evacuate or take 
action is presented. 
Gonzales (2008) attempts to describe the actions that keep people from reacting 
immediately during emergencies. He writes that when people are frightened their 
emotional systems take over to initiate some form of normalcy or normal behaviors  
(p. 56). This is reinforced by Ripley (2008) when she describes one particular survivor of 
the WTC who, on September 11, 2001 cleared off her desk, made no less than five phone 
calls and packed her personal things before being chided by a co-worker to leave the 
building. This particular individual had survived the 1993 bombings of the WTC (pp. 9–
11). DeBecker (1997) describes human high-stakes predictions as using perceived 
alternatives, perceived consequences, and perceived abilities. These predictions are based 
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on the individual’s measurability (of a threat), vantage point (based on known or 
unknown information), imminence, context, pre-incident indicators (such as pre-incident 
fire and evacuation drills, or lack thereof), personal experiences, comparable events (not 
necessarily identical), objectivity (can that person allow themselves to believe the 
possible outcomes), investment (in the outcome), and replicability (to their knowledge 
has this ever occurred before) (pp. 94–95, 97–100). 
Crowds often make us callous in emergencies. According to Sommers (2011), 
group think may render all of us less likely to take action and inject ourselves into the 
affairs of others when we’re surrounded by others (p. 1). He offers several explanations 
for this: (a) We’re less likely to interpret the events as an emergency, (b) when we are 
unsure of events we tend to look at those around us to gauge their reactions–if they’re 
calm we’re more likely to keep to ourselves, and (c) having other people around lets us 
rest on the assumption that someone else will take care of it (or call for help, etc.). 
Sommers calls this “diffusion of responsibility” (p. 20).  
Therefore, if we can understand the influences that directly affect humans in both 
individual and group settings during emergencies, we may begin to organize and develop 
recommendations to reduce human fatalities.  
D. WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
It has been demonstrated that successful response to emergency situations is a 
combination of learned behavior, prior planning, appropriate occupant behavior, and 
properly and effectively installed protection, detection, and security systems. Of these 
three elements, occupant behavior usually has the most significant impact on an 
individual’s survival, where planning and installed protection systems have the greatest 
impact on group survival (Schroll, 2002, p. 53). This literature review has found that 
aside from fire protection and security systems, to help survivability during disasters and 
emergencies humans must rely on themselves. Post-September 11th renewal of survival 
interest theories and investigation (after being previously all but shut down due to lack of 
funding in the 1980s) is a testament to the importance of such work. As shown 
throughout this literature review research has debunked many of the myths associated 
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with civilian survival (e.g., people being incapacitated due to panic, that they will 
evacuate immediately, and chaos will result in disorderly evacuations, etc.). Debunking 
those myths have helped rewrite building codes and architectural and emergency 
response and management design throughout the United States. 
1. Time to Invest 
In an interview on social impact and how social research can help assist 
emergency planners, Pittman (2012) interviews Ms. Kathleen Tierney, director of the 
National Hazards Center at the University of Colorado. Discussing the multitude of 
preparedness research, Tierney states how social research has found that “being better 
prepared is associated with having higher levels of income, homeownership, to some 
extent with having previous disaster experience, and having children in the home” (p. 
41). She explains that all of these factors are sociological and can help explain reasons 
why some people are more prepared than others. One of the most surprising findings in 
Tierney’s emergency preparedness research is that the way most people think about 
disaster behavior and preparedness (such as the sense of pro-social behaviors where 
neighbors look out for each other pre- and post-event) runs contrary to common sense. 
Discussing emergency agency outreach, Tierney states that perhaps we have spent 
enough money on specialized equipment, uniforms, Hazmat suits, and mobile command 
posts, and now that everyone has all that they will ever need, we should begin to 
concentrate and invest more on community outreach and education. Particularly to 
organizations who serve our most vulnerable populations (p. 42). 
E. CONCLUSION 
Concluding this literature review, Ripley (2008) offers several survival tactics: 
Building disaster skills, which are our ability to do something automatically that is 
programmed subconsciously by practice (referring to emergency action plans); erasing 
fear of liability on the part of government employees (based on ignorance) when it comes 
to enacting tougher laws requiring evacuation drills and written emergency plans, 
because those employees are in most cases protected from lawsuits (p. 212); re-evaluate 
reforms that focus solely on technological fixes and experts, by enlisting and educating 
 31 
regular people and making them responsible for their own safety and survival decisions 
(p. 211); repeatedly rehearsing emergency scenarios, which is the best way to make our 
brains perform under actual high-stress events; and giving people directions, but if none 
is forthcoming they should have already been given the tools to take their own actions (p. 
131). These suggestions mirror Gonzales’ training scripts concept, which if not practiced 
can actually make us overreact and cause more harm than good (2008, p. 44). Sommers 
(2011) concludes that learning how the presence of others may influence our behaviors 
by promoting apathy can lead us to be uncomfortable with our own inaction (p. 2). In 
addition, DeBecker (1997) concludes that taking precautions is constructive while living 
in fear is destructive (p. 281).  
According to Ripley (2008), since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has 
dispersed over $23 billion to individual states and cities in the name of homeland 
security. However, almost none of that money has gone towards intelligently recruiting 
the general public into taking responsibility for their own survival (p. xiii); the vast 
majority of the public is simply not educated enough on what to do when disaster strikes. 
We must empower ourselves and each other to take precautions, to be prepared and to not 
live in fear. The literature suggests that, in contrast to Paulsen’s report (1981) and similar 
studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, human behavior can in fact be predictable and 
therefore molded. The literature reviewed above discusses that although intuition can 
generally not be taught (due to its natural, inherent trait in humans and animals alike), 
how humans tend to dwell and rely on intuition can be. Additionally, according to the 
literature, intuition, if acted on alone, is unreliable. However, when intuition is 
acknowledged, and taken together with available cues, people will allow themselves to 
make faster and better survival decisions. This learned behavior will help people resist 
the natural urge to overthink the situation or expect that everything is “normal” or always 
going to be OK.  
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IV. METHODS AND PROCEDURE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and reveal the nature and role of human 
thought processes and actions during emergencies and disasters, and on this basis to put 
forward recommendations that may help reduce fatalities during emergencies and 
disasters. The literature review has found an abundance of material available to address 
the topic. Heuristics (science of trial and error); utility theory (methodical evaluation of 
alternative choices); human reactions, such as fear, intuition, emotion, and past 
experience; and group versus individual dynamics each impact the decision-making 
process, and if people can change the way they think, act, and problem solve during 
emergencies, they could improve their chances of survival (Kahneman et al., 1982). The 
research conducted for this thesis has strived to understand how and why people behave 
the way they do, and how they ultimately make decisions, perform, and react during 
emergencies.  
A. METHODS 
1. Sample and Data Collection 
Several methodologies were applied as part of this research. Those methods 
include: 
2. Case Studies 
General snapshots of actual published events, and human reactions to them, were 
captured from the literature review and compiled to examine and analyze the presented 
data to help answer the research questions. In particular, the actions of individuals, as 
well as the interactions of groups, were examined to exemplify trends, strengths, and 





3. Policy Analysis  
Policy Analysis was also applied to assist in presenting varying solutions. 
Formalized and documented policies, such as building evacuations plans, engineering 
formulas, and so forth, were examined to assist in determining how effective and realistic 
those policies are.  
It has been theorized that people choose alternative actions based on given 
scenarios they are confronted with and the informational cues that they receive. When 
people are able to add and compare that information to formal training received, or life 
experiences they have had instilled internally, they may be in a better position to make 
sound decisions.  
4. Grounded Theory 
Grounded Theory was considered for application to this thesis to establish sets of 
criteria, such as rules and procedures, to judge if outcomes of human behavior can be 
manipulated, and/or if human behaviors can be expanded to increase the likelihood that 
decision making can be improved and survivability increased. However, it was 
discovered early on that the use of this methodology would be of limited use due to time 
constraints and the inability to apply and evaluate the research recommendations prior to 
the thesis deadline. 
5. Data Analysis 
The descriptive research methodology, sampling and data collection and analysis 
were used to answer the following questions: 1. What research has been previously 
performed to examine civilian survivability? 2. What are the cognitive functions that 
allow or prohibit people in making correct life-saving decisions? 3. Are there patterns in 
the way that people process information and perceive danger? 4. What are the critical 
elements that allow some people to survive, while others in the same situation perish? 5. 
What can be done to increase the chances that civilians will make the correct choice of 
action during emergencies and disasters? 
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The descriptive research methodology helped reach the conclusions of the thesis 
by identifying existing sets of human reactions and decision making and their limits. 
Once the decision limitations are identified, steps can be taken or recommended to 
overcome them and to establish realistic alternatives that individuals and/or groups can 
successfully apply to various situations. These conclusions and recommendations will 
prove valuable to the ongoing discussion of successful human decision making.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 
1. The Thinker’s Toolkit 
While a master’s student at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS’s) Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security in Monterey, CA, the author attended a research 
colloquium (March 2012). Where the students were challenged to develop a hypothesis 
for their thesis utilizing techniques found in The Thinker’s Toolkit (Jones, 1998). The 
author of this research focused on Part Two of the book and Jones’ “Fourteen Tools” for 
problem solving as a step toward narrowing the potentially broad thesis topic. While 
considering the “Fourteen Tools” it became clearly evident that the thesis topic narrowed 
the prospects down to three of the Fourteen. They were: Hypothesis Testing, Devil’s 
Advocacy and the Utility Tree techniques. Early on it was apparent that the Devil’s 
Advocacy tool incorporates the Hypothesis Testing model; thus, the choices were actually 
narrowed down to just the two remaining choices.  
2. The Utility Tree Model 
The Utility Tree model is intriguing as it focuses on the end user’s self-interest. In 
my thesis, that self-interest (utility) for civilians would equal their presumed goal of 
wanting to survive emergencies and disasters. One of our “defense” strategies is to deny 
danger to ourselves. For example, “just world theory” proposes that we interpret the 
world as fair, and as a place where bad things only happen to bad people (Lerner, 1980). 
Consequently, we go about our daily lives, denying the dangers that might lie ahead.  
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It is self-evident that a common theme amongst all of the almost 3,000 victims at 
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was that they went to work that day, as 
far as we know, still believing that disasters would not happen to them or affect their 
daily lives. To arrive at a conclusion using the Utility Tree analysis, I would need to 
answer three questions for the general public posed by Jones: (a) The Utility Question—
Will an emergency happen to me today and, if it does, will I live or die? (b) Probability 
Question—What are the chances of an emergency happening to me today? And (c) 
Expected Value—If I am aware that emergencies do and can happen to me and I am 
trained to be aware of my surroundings and the possible outcomes, will I know what to 
do and be confident that I will be able to make correct decisions? According to Jones, the 
outcomes of these options must be exclusive and collectively exhaustive (p. 252). 
Admittedly, it would be impossible to analyze all the possible outcomes. However, the 
Utility Tree’s general technique of questioning was part of this research. This thesis’ 
hypothesis speculates that the general public can be taught to make better decisions for 
their survival (which equates to their self-interest or applicable utility). 
3. Devil’s Advocate 
Lastly, the Devil’s Advocate technique (which encompasses Hypothesis Testing) 
has been applied to develop the hypothesis and strengthen the main argument. According 
to Jones (1998), taking the “devil's position” simply for argument’s sake is to challenge 
the rationale presented on a given topic, the idea being that through this process the truth 
will stand out and remain intact. The challenge is not due to the disbelief of the 
challenger, but simply helps test validity. Devil’s advocacy works best by seeking, with 
either the same or other evidence, the opposite of whatever the original view holds. As an 
analytical tool, it is useful because by design it focuses on a contrary opinion. It views the 
problem one-dimensionally. It examines alternative solutions and evaluates evidence that 
supports the opposing view. Additionally, the devil's advocate technique may go further 
by seeking out and obtaining new evidence. This may open the mind of the original 
presenter to new dimensions and/or perceptions of the problem. Presumably, the devil’s 
advocate technique pokes holes in false self-serving arguments and strips away thinly 
reasoned and supported analysis. 
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Applying the Devil’s Advocate technique assisted the author in defending the 
thesis’ central claim (that the general public can be trained to make better decisions). By 
anticipating challenges and being able to respond to them within the research, the author 
was able to successfully meet the warrant component (Wollman, 2011) of the stated 
argument. This was accomplished by logically linking the thesis claim with supportive 
and well-documented reasoning. Presenting the argument in an organized and compelling 
way, based on what others have published on the subject, will give more credibility to the 
argument.  
The hypothesis and argument of this thesis contends that although research has 
been conducted to identify how people make decisions—especially in emergencies—
none of the research or published literature make any suggestions on how to effectively 
change negative decision-making outcomes. With a seemingly endless supply of real-life 
stories as examples, the issue that some people survive based on their styles of thoughts 
and actions (or inactions) cannot be ignored. After identifying the problem and 
documenting what others have to say about it, my thesis will attempt to go further and 
make recommendations for how policy can move forward.  
Applying the Devil’s Advocate technique allowed this researcher to attack some 
primary research views that the public cannot be taught to save themselves. It was found 
that considering counter-point insights helped define the main research question (why do 
some people live and some people die in the same emergencies and disasters) and the five 
specific secondary questions. This technique also guided the thesis process in organizing 
the published works of others to form a conclusion and help solve the research problem 
(i.e., can civilians be taught to save themselves). Application of the Devil’s Advocate 
techniques produced follow-up questions that may include: How come some people who 
freeze and take no action still survive? Doesn’t luck, fate, or divine intervention help 
some people to survive? What about people who take action but it turns out to be the 
wrong action? Hasn’t this research been done before? Or, who will read and apply this 
research?  
This technique also allowed the researcher to build a claim that is relevant, 
specific, and significant. It assisted me in opening my mind to new dimensions of 
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perception concerning the problem and avoid the possibility of providing self-serving 
arguments or thinly reasoned and supported analysis. The Recommendations and 
Conclusion sections of this thesis will solidify the hypothesis as a declarative statement 
that has not previously tested (Jones, 1998). 
C. PROCEDURES 
The procedures employed to write this thesis consisted of developing a focused 
research problem, research purpose, and relevant research questions. An exhaustive 
literature review was then conducted. Published works and scientific research were 
gathered along with statistical records used for comparison and contrast. The descriptive 
research method has been utilized to detail the past and present relationship between 
civilian survival and fatalities.  
1. The Starting Line 
The first step of this thesis commenced in January 2012 when the author attended 
the first of six in-residence programs at the NPS’s Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security Master’s Degree Program in Monterey, CA. The collection and reading of 
literature was begun, as well as an overall organization of the required thesis elements. 
The development of a personal Roadmap to Success (see Appendix B), as well as a 
Required Elements and Working Timeline check-off sheet (see Appendix C) were also 
drafted at that time. An initial goal of September 1, 2012, was selected as a target date to 
complete the first thesis draft. Unfortunately, that goal was not realized. Allowing for 
flexibility with the research flow, a second draft completion goal of October 1, 2012, was 
established.  
Throughout an NPS research and writing course and subsequent research 
colloquium, a hypothesis, introduction, methods, abstract, and literature review were 
constructed. Thesis advisors were selected and contacted, and permission to move 
forward with the project was secured. By March 2012, the executive summary (later to 




submitted and ultimately approved. A non-NPS affiliated editor’s services were also 
retained and the first drafts of the completed thesis sections were forwarded to the 
advisors for input commencing on September 5, 2012.  
2. Beyond the Fire and Emergency Services 
The extension of the literature review beyond the fire and emergency services 
proved advantageous to the research, particularly when attempting to apply scientific data 
to civilian fire survivability. However, one limitation of outside sources included the lack 
of recent studies. The outside perspectives—mostly scientifically based—validated the 
research purpose and will ultimately assist in answering the research questions. 
Furthermore, uncovered research concerning psychological do-or-die and intuition-based 
decision making proved particularly relevant.  
The Internet played a vital role throughout this research project. The Internet was 
used to elicit information, define thesis limitations, and to clarify definitions. Several 
articles referenced in the literature review were retrieved via the Internet from the 
Learning Resource Center of the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, 
MD, as well as from the World Wide Web. 
3. Limitations 
General limitations of this thesis include the unfortunate fact that, due to an 
extensive Institutional Review Board process, scheduling conflicts, and logistical issues, 
face-to-face interviews could not be conducted to evaluate the realistic potential of 
civilian survivability. A secondary, general limitation, was the potentially large topic area 
and the necessity to concentrate on the less broad perspective. Keeping the problem and 
purpose of the research in focus was a key to overcoming this limitation.  
Additionally, it should be noted that a major contribution to the timing and 
success of this research was the backing up and saving of the different versions of the 
thesis after each session of work. Although there were some technological glitches along 
the way, the inevitable setbacks provided a clear value of hand-written documentation,  
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and hard-copy printing of the report as it progressed, and the backing up of all 
information to reliable outside sources rather than total reliance on one single electronic 
hardware source. 
4. The Finish Line 
The final stages in completing this thesis (December 2012–January 2013) 
included compiling the materials, organizing the processes involved, and writing the final 
version with input from the advisors and editor. The formatting, typing, and proofreading 
of the paper and, the ultimate submission of the completed thesis to the NPS were 
accomplished well in advance of the final submission deadline (March 29, 2013).  
D. CONCLUSION 
To study the importance of human thought processes and produce 
recommendations that may help reduce fatalities during emergencies and disasters, an 
organized and steadfast approach to the research was required. The methods and 
procedures as described above allowed the thesis to grow, naturally, as the abundance of 
published material was examined and the information systematically arranged. The 
ability to maintain a narrowed focus throughout the process was instrumental. 
Developing the research questions through several methodologies allowed for an all-
encompassing look at the problem and resulted in a concrete rationale to definitively 
answer the research questions. Additionally, early establishment of a personal roadmap 
and check-off sheet for the required elements together with timelines for both proved to 
be crucial to completing the project on time  
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V. RESULTS 
Americans tend to be die-hard optimists, literally. It is part of what makes 
this country great—and vincible....Ours is a strange culture of irrational 
distrust—buoyed by irrational optimism. (Ripley, 2006, pp. 3–4) 
A. COMMON THEMES 
Throughout the literature review and research procedures three common threads 
consistently emerged: (a) In most emergencies and disasters (but certainly not all), people 
who survived made a conscious decision to take immediate action; (b) in most instances, 
survivors had planned ahead or been mentally prepared to deal with emergent 
circumstances before they occurred, and (c) education in emergency actions and 
planning, the gathering of information and clear communication all play a vital role in 
civilian survival. These three common themes directly correlate to the problem, purpose 
and research questions of this thesis. 
The organizational steps of this research were aimed at compiling and examining 
published literature on human reactions and decision making, and to then compare those 
with scientific findings on the same topics. The two sets of information were then 
collated into a singular discussion on the main topic area—why do some people live and 
others die in the same emergencies and disasters, and can civilians be taught to save 
themselves? 
The reasons for selecting the particular literature and scientific research found 
within this thesis are the correlations shown between the science of human behavior and 
the reality of those behaviors in everyday, real-world scenarios. The blending of applied 
arts (everyday human reactions under extraordinary circumstances) and the sciences (the 
study of human behavior) has assisted in answering the research questions. To that end, 
the following results are presented.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Question One 
What research has been previously performed to examine civilian survivability? 
As exemplified throughout the literature review there are a multitude of nonfiction 
published works on the topic of survivability and human reaction to emergencies and 
disasters. Although many of these works are published by non-scientific authors 
(Campbell, 2000; Connell, 2001; DeBecker, 1997; George, 2010; Gonzales, 2003, 2008; 
Keating & Loftus, 1981; Klein, 1999; Lerner, 1980; Prince, 1920; Ripley, 2006, 2009; 
Sommers, 2011; Winerman, 2004), several scientifically based studies and reports were 
found, viz., Corbitt et al., 1967; Elinder and Erixson, 2012; FDNY, 2012b; Frey et al., 
2010; Gershon et al., 2007; Hall, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1974, 1979, 1999; Latane & 
Darley, 1968; McClennan et al., 2011; NIST, 2002, 2009, 2010; USFA, 2002, 2011b, 
2011c, 2012b; Pan, 2006; Paulsen, 1981.  
The significance in differentiating between nonfiction authors and scientific 
studies in this field is that the former tend to document what events transpired, who was 
involved, and how they handle the given situation. These works also identify problems 
and issues in decision making that arose from those circumstances as interpreted through 
the author’s opinions. The latter on the other hand, attempt to answer the why of these 
occurrences. They base their findings on science-based studies and validated 
psychological research. Additionally, the science studies–although certainly written by 
authors–add validity to the nonfiction works, as well as to the thesis topic.   
This research attempts to relate human decision making to the broad spectrum of 
emergencies and disasters. However, several scientific studies and a plethora of published 
works—in addition to those in the Literature Review—were found that specifically relate 
to human reaction during fires. It was found that the results of fire-related fatalities and 
survival statistics, combined with the significant and detailed reporting of such 
information, lend themselves to in-depth examination more readily than other types of 
emergencies and disasters. 
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a. Fire Data 
The data-gathering procedure for this thesis was aided by the official 
statistics available through government agencies. According to the USFA (2012), the 
Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 authorizes the USFA’s National Fire 
Data Center to gather and analyze information on the magnitude of the nation’s fire 
problem, as well as its detailed characteristics and trends. The Act further authorizes the 
USFA to develop uniform data-reporting methods, and to encourage and assist state 
agencies in developing and reporting such data. To carry out the intentions of the Act, the 
National Fire Data Center has established the National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS).  
b. NFIRS 
The NFIRS has two objectives: (a) to help state and local governments 
develop fire reporting and analysis capability for their own use, and (b) to obtain data that 
can be used to more accurately assess and subsequently combat the fire problem at a 
national level. To meet these homeland security objectives, the USFA has developed a 
standard NFIRS package that includes incident and casualty forms, a coding structure for 
data-processing purposes, manuals, computer software and procedures, documentation, 
and a National Fire Academy training course for utilizing the system. Currently, all 50 
states, the District of Columbia, and 23,000 U.S. fire departments report through NFIRS 
annually. That statistic accounts for greater than 75% of all reported fires that occur 
throughout the U.S. (USFA, 2012a). 
c. Structural Fire Deaths 
The research uncovered that between 2006 and 2010, 75% of all civilian 
fire fatalities occurred as a result of fires in residential buildings or private homes. The 
majority of those deaths occurred between the hours of 10 pm and 6 am and accounted 
for 49% of fatal fires and 51% of fire fatalities (see Figure 4) (USFA, 2011c).  
During the same time, span nonresidential structure fires accounted for 
less than 5% of annual U.S. fire fatalities (USFA, 2012b). Nonresidential structure fires 
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include: public assembly (eating and drinking establishments), educational facilities, 
stores, office buildings, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside 
properties, other nonpermanent residential buildings (e.g., hotels and motels), and 
institutional properties, such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and 
hospitals (USFA, 2012b). 
 
Figure 4.  Residential Building Fire Fatalities by Time of Alarm 
Conversely, fires that occurred in both residential and nonresidential high-
rise structures—defined by the International Building Code and the Building 
Construction and Safety Code as: “buildings 75 feet or greater in height measured from 
the lowest level of fire department vehicle access to the floor of the highest occupiable 
story”(Hall, 2011)—accounted for just over 6% of all fire fatalities. Yet, in the wake of 
the tragic events of September 11, 2001, high-rise fires and high-rise firefighting tactics 
have assumed a more prominent role in the consciousness of the U.S. fire service and 
American society as a whole (USFA, 2002). 
(1) Contributing Factors. As depicted in Figure 5, the most 
notable factors that contributed to fatalities in residential buildings were: (a) the fire 
progression, (b) egress, and (c) escape problems. Fire progression factors involve 
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situations where fire exits were blocked by smoke and/or flame and where vision is 
blocked or impaired by smoke, and civilians are trapped above or below the fire. Egress 
problems include such factors as crowded situations, limited exits, blocked/locked exits 
and mechanical obstacles or other problems with the exit. Escape factors include 
unfamiliarity with exits, excessive travel distances to the nearest exit, choice of 
inappropriate exit routes, and re-entering the fire structure (USFA, 2011c).  
 
Figure 5.  Contributing Factors to Residential Civilian Fire Fatalities 
Additional contributing factors were age and the ability to self-
evacuate. Figure 6 shows the leading activities during fire fatalities (sleeping and 
escaping) and compares them with the age groups of those killed. Excluding the age 
groups of under 10 and over 80 (who presumably may have difficulty removing 
themselves), the greatest number of fatalities are found to be in the 10 to 79-year range 
and particularly in the 10- to 69-age range. Presumably, the 10- to 69-range represents 
those attending full-time educational facilities and/or full-time work locations where 
emergency preparedness education would prove to be the most beneficial.  
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Figure 6.  Leading Activities Resulting in Civilian Fire Fatalities 
Figure 7 illustrates fire fatalities by age group and gender. Of 
particular note is that male fatalities regularly out-number female fatalities. The accepted 
understanding for this dichotomy is that women tend to evacuate earlier than men, or are 
found attempting to warn/rescue children or older adults. Males, on the other hand, are 
more often than not found close to the fire origin as they are more likely to attempt to 
extinguish the fire (McLennan, 2011). 
Additionally, males in the age range of 13 to 70 years are 
particularly vulnerable to fatality in fires. The general understanding for that statistic is 
that they are most likely to take extinguishment action or attempt to rescue others who 
may be trapped. Further, the mid- to upper-end of that age range represents homeowners 




Figure 7.  Fire Fatalities by Age and Gender 2001–2011 
(2) Activities Prior to Death. Perhaps the most significant 
finding of this research is the reported activities of civilians prior to death. According to 
the USFA (2011c) slightly more victims in residential structure fires (35.9%) died 
attempting to escape while slightly less (34.3%) died in their sleep (see Figure 8). With 
the notable exceptions of having installed, operational smoke detection systems (to 
provide early warning of a fire in progress and allow more time for escape) and sprinkler 
systems (to prevent the growth and spread of a fire), it is the action of escaping and the 
lack of a preset escape plan and forethought that is the focus of this research. 
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Figure 8.  Civilian Activity Prior to Fire-Related Fatalities  
Regarding high rise office buildings and civilian behavior, perhaps 
no greater resource of information is available than that of the September 11, 2001, 
World Trade Center attacks. In addition to previously cited works of nonfiction authors 
who conducted interviews with survivors (Gonzales, 2003, 2008; Ripley, 2006, 2008; 
Sommers, 2011), there are notable in-depth scientific research studies, such as those of 
the NIST that were, and continue to be, conducted. Additionally, Gershon et al. (2007) 
highlight the vulnerability of high-rise structures with an emphasis on recent historic 
bombings, technological and infrastructure failures, and high-rise fires, and the difficulty 
of mass evacuation from these structures under these extreme conditions.  
d. Non-structural Fire Deaths 
McLennan et al. (2011) examined the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires that 
occurred in Victoria, Australia. How and why some people survived the extreme 
conditions (and why some people did not), and what can be done to avoid such 
devastating events in the future were the context of their analysis. Although 173 people 
perished in those fires, many (33) survived conditions that were so extreme, they could 
have easily died. The authors contend that while 30% of the fatalities showed some 
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evidence of defensive firefighting (including 5% active defense, and 25% some or 
questionable defense [p. 41]), an additional 26% apparently took a wait-and-see posture 
before deciding what to do. However, the authors point out that it is unclear as to what 
triggering mechanism these people might have been waiting for. The remaining plurality 
were believed to have been sheltering in place without taking any definitive or defensive 
actions whatsoever. For some of them that may have been part of their emergency plan 
(p. 41).  
Of the 301 fire-impacted survivors, 67% were men and 33% were women. 
The ages of the survivors ranged from 34 to 68 years. The study found that women were 
more likely to have evacuated prior to being impacted by the fire, particularly for those 
who had children. Men, on the other hand, were more likely to choose to stay and defend 
their property.  
e. Non-fire Disasters and Deaths 
The research also found human behavior studies that have been conducted 
for disasters other than structural fires, such as Frey et al. (2010) who studied social norm 
comparisons between the sinking of the Titanic and her sister ship the Lusitania. They 
point out that although the two ships and the composition of their passengers were nearly 
identical, the behavior of the individuals on board each were dramatically different. On 
the Titanic, for instance, they found that social norms and social class status prevailed, 
where on the Lusitania selfish and “survival of the fittest” behaviors dominated. 
Conversely, Elinder and Erixson (2012) debunk the long held maritime notions of 
“women and children first” and “the captain always goes down with the ship.” In fact, 
after analyzing 18 maritime disasters spanning 300 years, and covering the fate of over 
15,000 passengers and crew, they found that: (a) women have a distinct disadvantage of 
surviving over men, (b) crew members do not necessarily give priority to passengers 
(they actually survive at significantly higher rates), (c) under maritime law the ship’s 
captain has the authority to enforce normal behavior, and (d) they conclude that in life-
and-death situations the expression “every man for himself” may be a more accurate 
phrase.  
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In yet another research report (Brunkard et al., 2008) conducted on deaths 
in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina (August 29, 2005), it found that contributing 
factors leading to many of the deaths were lack of prior planning, information, ability, 
and transportation. Furthermore, the report cites that the majority of deaths occurred to 
the elderly and sick or infirmed. The report concludes that this vulnerable population 
remained in areas that were most susceptible to the severe flooding, because they feared 
looting, were unable to continue with their daily routines, and/or were not medically 
capable of leaving.  
f. Conclusion 
The common themes of both nonfiction literature and study-based 
scientific means were found that directly correlate to the problem, purpose and research 
of this thesis. The abundance of detailed previous research has allowed for definitive 
outcomes to be established, and for significant recommendations to be made. 
2. Question Two 
What are the cognitive functions that allow or prohibit people in making correct 
life-saving decisions? It was found that dependent upon if the discussion consisted of 
group versus individual behavior, the cognitive reactions of people during emergencies 
and disasters can vary greatly. An unexpected finding was the disagreement in 
philosophies between Ripley (2008) and DeBecker (1997). Where DeBecker believes we 
are driven by instinct to make decisions, Ripley feels that evolution can actually impair 
our cognitive decision-making functions. Due to the fact that human evolution has been 
outpaced by the rapid and almost instantaneously changing modern society, Ripley 
argues that instincts are, at best, unreliable.  
a. Emotions and Reactions 
VonAppen (2010) reveals that emotions, such as fear and anger, can 
produce overwhelming physical reactions to extreme stress. He found that those who 
survive make correct decisions by overcoming their emotional response to the 
environment in which they find themselves. Gonzales (2003) concurs. He adds that 
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survivors are not immune to fear, but rather, they become keenly aware of their 
surroundings. And, although these individuals may be scared, it is what they do about it 
next that may make all the difference.  
A number of authors—Breen (2000), Campbell (2000), George (2010), 
Gonzales (2008), Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Klein (1999), and Pan (2006)—
conclude that individuals rely on emotional shortcuts or mental scripts to make 
themselves feel safe and happy, even though those shortcuts may prove to be delusional 
and not based on reality. It is that quest to feel safe and secure that causes people to 
overlook obvious cues, clues, and factors, ultimately creating more uncertainty. That 
uncertainty thus produces more shortcuts as they spiral towards indecision or maintaining 
the status quo. Furthermore, relating perception or preconceived notions to a given 
situation may blind individuals to what is actually occurring. Nassin (2010) agrees that 
utilizing the same old techniques to solve new, complex challenges in today’s world will 
not work for the majority of individuals who find themselves in emergent circumstances.  
Interestingly, it was found that several of the above authors agree that in 
the work of emergency services and sometimes in the world of business, those same 
instincts and intuitive skills are based on past experience and actually aide the decision-
making process. These individuals are capable of isolating their emotions, and compare 
their instincts with alternatives (based on past experience) before settling on the best 
possible outcome (Breen, 2000; Campbell, 2000; George, 2010; Klein, 1999). However, 
in what appeared to be a dissenting view, VonAppen (2010), writing on the cognitive 
functions of a group of firefighters caught in a life-threatening scenario (of possibly 
burning to death), proposes that: 
Our emotional response will overrule our ability to think in a rational 
manner. Cognition, the ability to think things through, is at once cast aside 
in favor of an emotional response. Knowing what we are supposed to do is 
no match for the power of our emotions. (p. 4)  
Therefore, according to VonAppen, if the professionally trained firefighters in the above 
scenario were not able to set aside their emotions to safely remove themselves from this  
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untenable situation, what chance would untrained civilians have? This was an unexpected 
finding of the research and one that will be challenged in the discussion section of this 
thesis.  
b. Acknowledging Reality 
The majority of the research found that emotions can be held in check if 
people acknowledge the reality of the world around them, as it is exists at that exact time, 
that is mindfulness (George, 2010). The research has determined that definitive action 
must be a conscious process during emergencies. Intuition and emotion may lead to 
incorrect choices and irrational behavior; therefore, individuals must make quick 
decisions based on an acknowledgement of how things are and not what they would like 
them to be (Gonzales, 2003, 2008; DeBecker, 1997; Gershon et al., 2007; Pan, 2006; 
Ripley, 2006, 2008; Kahneman et al., 1974, 1979, 1999; Keating & Loftus, 1981). 
On group behavior, the research found that Connell (2001) focused his 
report on the emerging norms in the decision to evacuate in the framework of collective 
group behavior demonstrated during the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center 
(WTC) on September 11, 2001. He concluded three key factors affected the decision to 
evacuate: (a) social locations within the buildings and respective workspaces, (b) the role 
of leaders, both formal and informal, and (c) the level of perceived threat. He, like 
Winerman (2004) found that panic was not widely observed and definitions of previously 
established norms (panic, self-serving behavior, etc.) were rarely evident. 
Likewise, Gershon et al. (2007) and Connell (2001) also analyzed the 
WTC evacuation and found that group behavior (and organizational behavior) were 
affected by: (a) preparedness planning, (b) training and education of employees, and (c) 
risk communications amongst building occupants and work space locations. They also 
cited leadership as a factor that influenced many in the evacuation. Many evacuees 
reported that rapid and decisive direction by a person perceived to be an authority figure 
prompted their evacuation. Several of these leaders were informal. According to the 
studies of Gershon et al. (2007) and Connell (2001) only a small number of WTC 
evacuees reported that a work place manager led to the decision to leave or physically led 
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the evacuation. This is in concurrence to Pan’s research (2006) that many individuals do 
not want to make decisions on their own especially based on limited information. 
According to Ripley (2008), DeBecker (1997), Gonzales (2003, 2008), Connell (2001) 
and Gershon et al. (2007) for a large number of workers at the WTC this led to long 
delays in evacuating.  
Likewise, in a study of occupant behavior during a high-rise office 
building fire NIST (2010) found that evacuation times and the actions of occupants pre-
evacuation and during evacuation (e.g., waiting for information, helping others and 
evacuation preparation) were main factors that significantly increased evacuation times 
(p. 2). Additionally, the NIST study determined that certain actions (e.g., searching for 
information and confirming information about an incident) have been identified as ones 
that actually increased pre-evacuation delays (p. 4).  
The research for this thesis also discovered in Gonzales (2003, 2008), 
Kahneman et al. (1982, 1999), and NIST (2002, 2010) that an occupant’s perception of 
risk, and the acquisition of sensory cues (Gershon et al., 2007) were factors that decrease 
the occupant’s overall pre-evacuation time (NIST, 2010, p. 4). 
c. Conclusion 
In answering research Question Two, the results show that the cognitive 
factors of perception, past experiences, planning and training, reliability on instincts, 
controlling emotions, and focus are all associated with better decision making. 
Conversely, group mentalities, such as waiting for someone to take charge, information 
seeking, milling, preparing for evacuation, and assisting others are the cognitive functions 
that may actually prohibit better decision making during emergencies and disasters.  
3. Question Three 
Are there patterns in the way people process information and perceive danger? 
NIST (2009) concluded that there are four phases of human behavioral processes that 
govern occupant response during fires and emergencies: Phase 1–Perception, Phase 2–
Interpretation, Phase 3–Decision Making, and Phase 4–Action Performance. These 
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phases and the factors that influence actions are individual–distinct to the occupants 
within the building–and are dependent upon such characteristics as: (a) the building and 
its detection and protection systems, (b) building layout, and (c) the significance of the 
fire and/or smoke event.  
Perception: In this phase, building occupants perceive (or receive) external 
physical and social cues from their surrounding environment. Such cues may include: 
experiencing flames, smoke, heat, or debris, and picking up on social cues, such as 
hearing others’ discussions, witnessing other people’s actions or inactions, and/or 
receiving phone calls from outside the building. Uncertainty, information overload, time 
pressure, individual thoughts, and memories from past experiences and education are all 
considered to be additional “complex conditions or states” (NIST, 2009, p. 6) that may 
further influence an individual’s behavior. 
Interpretation: This phase is where the occupant attempts to analyze the 
information received during the first phase. Decision Making: During this phase, the 
occupant makes suppositions on what to do next. Action performance: In this final phase, 
the occupant may carry out the actions decided upon in the previous phase. As illustrated 
in Figure 3 the process occurs in a constant continuum as further cues and decision 
consequences are experienced. 
a. Factors of Influence 
To account for the possible factors of influence that may affect an 
occupant’s behavioral processes (Phase 1), research shows that both occupant- and cue-
based factors influence whether a person perceives, or is able to perceive (without 
physical or emotional limitations that would prevent perception), a particular cue. 
Occupant-based factors can influence individual perception and receipt of 
certain cues, such as visual impairments and hearing impairments. Appendix A represents 
an overview of possible factors for phases 1 and 2 of the behavioral process and its 
influence over occupant decision making. Based on data and theory from human 
behaviors in fires, community-wide disasters, and other types of emergencies, the 
relationship that NIST (2009) attempts to demonstrate is how certain factors either 
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increase or decrease an occupant’s behavior in Phase 1 (Perception), and how that 
increase or decrease directly correlates to occupant interpretation of events and the 
occupant’s ultimate decision making (Phase 3) and action performance (Phase 4).  
The factors of influence (Appendix A) have been categorized into two 
main types: occupant-based factors and cue-based factors. Occupant-based factors 
include pre-event items which are those factors possessed by the occupant prior to the 
event taking place (e.g., education, training, demographics, etc.), and event factors which 
are possessed by the occupant as a function of the event itself (e.g., not being able to use 
stairs, etc.). Cue-based factors are inherent to the particular event; they vary in number, 
complexity, source, or type of cues presented (alarms, smoke, other occupants, and other 
people’s actions).  
b. Cues, Clues, and Shortcuts 
The 2009 NIST study, The Process of Human Behavior in Fires, 
concludes that behavior during a building fire or emergency is the result of behavioral 
processes that require further examination. Each of those processes begins with new cues 
and information from the physical and social environments surrounding the individual 
occupants. First, cues need to be perceived, then they must be interpreted, and then a 
decision must be made as to what action (including inaction) is taken. During an 
evacuation, individuals repeat this process over and over again as they engage in a variety 
of different activities.  
As previously detailed in the “Human Disaster Studies: A Languishing 
Science” chapter (p. 21) Kahneman and Tversky (1982, 1999) found that human 
decision-making patterns include applying emotional shortcuts and cognitive intuition 
first, then searching for information to solidify decisions second. Typically, these 
scientists found that Heuristics (the use of trial and error) is also a significant, yet 
untrustworthy form of decision-making patterns. 
Gonzales (2008), Pan (2006), and Klein (1999) all cite varying degrees of 
reliance on human instinct and the use of mental scripts from previous experiences as 
patterns to human decision-making, although Klein alone describes the success of these 
 56 
patterns when applied by high-stakes, life-and-death decision makers. Each of the others 
state that the use of past experience in emergencies and disasters for the lay person is, at 
best, unreliable.  
c. Arcs and Steps 
Ripley (2008) and Gonzales (2003) describe more in-depth patterns of 
decision making. In Ripley’s Survival Arc (p. 21) the pattern includes disbelief, 
deliberation and taking action, where Gonzales’ version (2003) includes denial, 
realization, chemical emotion, deterioration, and resignation. Although similar in 
approach to human decision-making patterns, they each describe differing variables in 
greater or lesser detail. Again, the NIST’s (2009) four phases of decision making 
(perception, interpretation, decision making and action performance), appear to add yet 
additional layers of theory to the way humans approach decision making. 
d. Conclusion 
On the surface there appears to be little consensus to the multitude of 
identifiable patterns used by humans to make emergent decisions. However, when 
initiating side-by-side comparisons, there are certainly re-emerging patterns and/or 
themes. For instance, when it comes to the general public and how they make decisions 
intuition, past experience, information gathering, and deliberation more often than not 
appear as reoccurring memes. Additionally, the human condition complicates these 
memes due to the fact that in different individuals some of them may occur 
independently, simultaneously, in short or long succession, and rarely sequentially. 
Putting aside (for now) the unreliable aspects of using such patterns, identifying the most 
common forms of human decision-making patterns may allow us to address the faulty 
processes involved and to emerge with a clearer understanding of how to adapt and 
overcome these pattern inadequacies. 
4. Question 4 
What critical elements allow some people to survive and others to die? The 
majority of the literature reviewed for this thesis claims that education, information, and 
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practice are the keys to human survival during emergencies and disasters (Campbell, 
2000; DeBecker, 1997; Frey et al., 2010; Gonzales, 2003, 2008; Hall, 2011; Kahneman et 
al., 1982; Keating et al., 1981; Latane et al., 1968; McLennan et al., 2011; NIST, 2009, 
2010; Ripley, 2006, 2008; Schroll, 2002; USFA, 2002, 2011b, 2011c; VonAppen, 2012; 
Winerman, 2004). In an interview on how social research impacts emergency planning, 
Kathleen Tierney (Pittman, 2012) sums up this sentiment when she states that among 
growing recognition in the homeland security/emergency management field is that, 
“while we need expert emergency management–we need well-trained, well-educated 
people–that the whole community is involved in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, 
and recovering from, disasters” (p. 41).  
According to Michael Byrne, National Incident Management Assistance 
Team Leader for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (personal 
communication, November 27, 2012, Hurricane Sandy recovery operations, New York, 
NY) the whole community approach has been and continues to be a major focus of 
FEMA. It is that important. Although many emergency agencies are also touting this 
whole-istic-community approach, Tierney laments, “It’s what sociologists have been 
saying all along” (Pittman, 2012, p. 41). 
a. Why Do Not We Prepare for Disasters? 
In a Time magazine article of the same name, Ripley (2006) writes that 
historically, humans do not get serious about avoiding disasters until after one has just 
“smacked them across the face” (p. 1). Further, Ripley quotes the former director of the 
U.S. Natural Hazards Center, Dennis Mileti, as saying, “We know exactly—exactly—
where the major disasters will occur.... but individuals under-perceive the risk” (p. 1). 
George Foresman, Under-Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security from 2005-
2007, estimates that less than 20% of monies earmarked for emergency management 
have gone to disaster planning and training of the public. Additionally, Americans “do 
not like being told what not to do, says Foresman” (Ripley, 2006). Foresman states that 
the U.S. Constitution limits the power of the federal government; therefore, it cannot 
force states, companies, or individual homeowners to act, and when the federal 
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government tries to demand changes with regulation, state and local officials “bristle at 
the interference.” He adds, “Like teenagers, we resent paternalism—until we’re in 
trouble. Then we expect to be taken care of” (Ripley, 2006, p. 6). 
b. Critical Example 
The research discovered a fitting example that illustrates how things 
should work: the law that mandates that all cruise ship passengers must receive a safety 
briefing before the ship leaves port. Similar to the safety briefing given on airplanes prior 
to take-off, this example addresses perhaps, the most critical of the elements previously 
identified, that may allow some people to survive and others to perish (viz., information, 
education, and practice). 
The cruise ship instructions go beyond that of the airlines in that they 
include locating and putting on life jackets, locating and using emergency exits, how to 
notify the crew, and where to muster in case of emergencies (Topham, 2012). This 
shining example may set the benchmark for other industries to follow in emergency 
preparedness.  
c. Conclusion 
Identifying the critical elements that allow some people to live and some 
people to die in the same emergencies and disasters at first appeared to be a daunting 
task. However, to answer this research question, the descriptive research method helped 
in narrowing the focus. The extensive literature available covering the vast field of 
disaster survival made it possible to discover that the critical elements were not as 
overwhelming or as elusive as it might first have appeared. Boiling the identified critical 
elements down, and separating all the extraneous components into their most basic origin, 
proved vital in answering this particular research question. The three consistently 
emerging themes that allow people to make better life-and-death decisions during 
emergencies and disasters almost exclusively relate to education, information, and 
application (i.e., practice). The identification of these critical elements will assist in 
making sound recommendations to help address those recurrent themes. 
 59 
5. Question 5 
What can be done to increase the chances that civilians will make the correct 
choice of action during emergencies and disasters? “The only thing tougher than planning 
for a disaster, is explaining why you didn’t” (Dartanner, 2011, p. 1). Educating the public 
on the importance of planning for emergencies without delay is a mantra for Dartanner. 
He feels that this liberating experience will help give people a sense of control over their 
own situations. He also compares disaster planning to a form of insurance where you 
hope you don’t ever need it, but if you do, it’ll be ready. He discusses how some people 
who have never been personally affected by a natural disaster often decide (consciously 
or subconsciously) to not deal with the subject at all, and how that can be a dangerous 
mistake. He uses the following scenario to make his point: 
It’s 2 o’clock in the afternoon and you receive a phone call from “Reverse 
911” informing you a fire is headed your way and you should evacuate 
immediately. 
You scoop up the cat and place her in a carrier, snap the dog’s leash on his 
collar and put both in the car. You then methodically collect the folder 
containing important papers, the photo album, computer disks, 
prescription meds, and other items on the “don’t forget to take” list kept 
on the fridge. 
You can feel the tension and anxiety, but you and your family have 
rehearsed this before, so you feel confident things will be OK. You have 
cleared flammables away from your home. You know your children’s 
school and spouse’s work disaster plans. You have your “get away” pack 
in the car. You know where you will meet with your family. You know 
several ways out of your neighborhood. 
Just as you start to leave, the phone rings. It’s your neighbor. She asks you 
what you are going to do. She wonders if you think the threat is real and if 
you have talked to anyone else. She wants to know if you think she should 
leave. (p. 1) 
Dartanner asks, “Why the different reactions to the same phone call?” He relates that you 
have “trained” your brain to instinctively know what to do by your preparations. Backed 
up by several other researchers and authors found in the Literature Review (viz. Breen, 
2000; Campbell, 2000; DeBecker, 1997; Elinder et al., 2012; Frey et al., 2010; George, 
2010; Gonzales, 2003, 2008; Hall, 2011; Jones, 1998; Kahneman et al., 1982, 1999; 
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Keating et al., 1981; Klein, 1999; Latane et al., 1968; Lerner, 1980; McLennan et al., 
2011; NIST, 2009, 2010; Paulsen, 1981; Prince, 1920; Pittman, 2012; Ripley, 2006, 
2008; VonAppen, 2012; Winerman, 2004). The common thread is that in emergencies, 
our instincts can be dangerous. We want to stay put, and we want things to be normal. 
According to Ripley (2005), research has shown that people will first check with several 
sources before deciding what to do just like the neighbor in the above scenario. This 
“freezing” behavior is instinctive. When people are caught up in a disaster, 10-15% will 
act quickly and properly, 15% will “freak out,” and the rest will do very little, stunned 
and bewildered (p. 60). That is why pre-planning is crucial. 
a. Brain Power 
The research shows that in an emergency, the brain slows down. Simple 
decisions may take several minutes to make under stress and the bombardment of new 
information. The same decisions when you are calm may take only seconds. Because 
time in the throes of a disaster may be exceedingly short for correct decision making, to 
increase the likelihood of survival, prior planning and a form of mindfulness (or of being 
in-the-moment) are a must (Breen, 2000; Campbell, 2000; George, 2010; Kahneman et 
al., 1982, 1999; Lerner, 1980). This objective not only applies to individuals, but 
according to the research, can be applied to municipalities, states, regions, and the nation 
as well. 
b. Rebuilding Complacency 
The Multihazard Mitigation Council of The National Institute of Building 
Sciences (NISB) published two reports on Parameters for an Independent Study To 
Assess the Future Benefits of Mitigation Activities in 2005 and 2010, respectively. In both 
volumes, the reports take a tour of “America’s Hazardscape.” Specifically, they look at 
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina, and at the state of 
Louisiana, in general. They comment on how this city and state have since passed new 
mandatory building codes similar to the state of Florida’s stringent 2001 building codes, 
which specifically relate to hurricane preparedness. They compare those codes with the 
state of Mississippi where 68,729 homes were lost in Katrina, yet its mandatory building 
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code was voted down and is now only voluntary. The reports examine and compare the 
Northeastern states, particularly New York, which they claim, according to insurance-
industry risk assessments, ranks as being the number two worst place for a hurricane to 
strike based on population, area, and rebuilding costs (second to Miami, FL).  
c. Toughen Up 
The NISB reports, similar to Ripley’s “Why We Don’t Prepare for 
Disasters” article (2006), question the allowing rebuilding in areas that are not just prone 
to flooding, but that flood repeatedly. They all but fault federal, state, and local 
governments for not taking tough enough steps to stop the redundant cost of rebuilding in 
storm-prone areas. The NISB conveys that for every dollar spent on basic preparedness 
and basic mitigation strategies, society saves an average of $4 in response, recovery, and 
restoration (2005). A positive example of tough decision-making strategies occurred in 
the Midwestern U.S. after devastating flooding in 1993. The federal government 
managed to buy out flood-prone properties. In partnership with state governments, the 
federal government bought 25,000 properties and thousands of acres of property, which 
were converted into wetlands. Those wetlands will now act as a buffer (or a sponge) to 
reduce the effects of storm surges. According to James Lee Witt, then the FEMA 
director, since 1993 “we never spent one dime on responding to those areas. Nobody lost 
everything they worked for” (Ripley, 2006, p. 6). 
d. New Building Codes 
Disseminating the research to help answer the question of what can be 
done to increase the chances that civilians will make the correct choice of action in 
emergencies and disasters, it was also found that in 2009 new comprehensive building 
and fire codes were approved by the International Code Council as recommended by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s NIST. These new building codes included stricter 
prescriptive changes—particularly in high-rise office buildings, following the September 
11, 2001, attacks of the World Trade Center and the evacuations of those structures. 
Although these new codes include making exit-path markings more prevalent and visible, 
they also cover requirements to ensure effective radio communications for first 
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responders. According to the Domestic Preparedness Journal (Gross, 2010), apparently 
what these new codes failed to do is to include informing and educating building 
occupants on just how to properly find and use these upgraded exits to escape. This is 
where the application of appropriate legislation would come in. Local laws particularly 
have the opportunity to fill the gaps in federal laws and requirements. Local politicians 
can look at the laws and take proactive steps to make their constituents and communities 
safer.  
e. Saving Pets Not Humans 
Additionally, no federal law currently require state and local officials to 
plan (much less educate the public) for the evacuation of themselves, the sick, elderly, 
disabled, or poor. However, the research uncovered that in 2006 Congress did pass a law, 
the Pets [sic] Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 (PETS), that cited 
how our city and state authorities’ disaster plans do not take into account how to rescue 
the portion of the population who are pet owners. To qualify for FEMA funding, a city or 
state is required to submit a plan detailing its disaster preparedness program. The PETS 
Act requires that the state and local emergency preparedness authorities include how they 
will accommodate households with pets or service animals when presenting these plans 
to FEMA. Congress felt this bipartisan legislation was necessary because Hurricane 
Katrina has clearly shown that when given a choice between their own personal safety or 
abandoning their household pets, a significant number of people will choose to risk their 
lives to remain with their pets. “It is now clear that requiring these jurisdictions to have 
plans in effect to deal with their pet-owning populations is a matter of public safety” 
(Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act, 2006). So, why is Congress able to 
pass laws concerning pets but not people? I suspect because it is easier than attempting to 
tell American citizens what to do for themselves, especially at the federal level. 
f. Conclusion 
To increase the chance that civilians will make the correct choice of action 
during emergencies and disasters, the research shows that we must first provide them 
with information of their vulnerabilities and the necessity of preparedness. We must 
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educate them in the possibilities and realities of human reactions so that they may 
identify how to remain prepared and maintain a mindful state during emergencies. 
Further, we must attempt as a nation to reduce risk by not placing communities in the 
most vulnerable of locations and regions. And lastly, government entities must make 
sound and tough decisions on protecting the people so that we don’t intentionally allow 
them in harm’s way.  
C. DISCUSSION 
A thesis is often broadly referred to as a doctrine that results from original 
research, designed to maintain or promote an argument or a proposition. It is put forth for 
consideration, and is designed to be discussed and defended against objections. Arguably, 
it is also understood that the result of such work is to add to the common knowledge of 
man and to promote a higher level of learning and understanding on a given topic. A 
greater achievement would be to have the outcome be used to positively affect the lives 
of others. It is that final thought that has propelled me through this process.  
Throughout the development of this thesis, I can honestly say that I learned a 
great deal from writing it and I hope that all who read this will learn a great deal as well.  
1. Why? Because Y Is a Crooked Letter 
To ask such a seemingly infinite question as Why Do Some People Live and Some 
People Die During The Same Emergencies and Disaster? might lead one to imagine that 
the vastness of the variables involved in answering such an inquiry would be insuperable. 
However, as I hope the research has proven, it is not. The research presents the argument 
that there are indeed very measurable and specific reasons related to styles of cognition 
and decision making. That is why people who find themselves in the middle of disasters 
can have different life-and-death outcomes. Granted, there are certainly situations where 
the fragile mortality of a human life occurs in such fractions of seconds that they are 
devoid of any chance for survival. However, as reflected in the case studies found within 
this research, more often than not, that is not the case.  
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2. Themes and Memes 
The central theme enabling us to answer the specific research question is 
identifying the presence of a knowledge gap as opposed to a policy issue. Although 
political, public, private, and individual policies can readily be seen as lacking when it 
comes to emergency preparedness; it is the acknowledgement that emergencies and 
disaster can (and do) happen to each of us, that is the more significant of the two 
concerns. Cultural memes, such as complacency, compliance, and taking action (or 
inaction) in given situations are the very concerns that I hope to affect with this research. 
Can the General Public Be Taught to Save Themselves? The answer to this part of the 
research question is an emphatic, YES! But, how then? 
Throughout the literature review, the reoccurring themes that emerge and offer 
insight into the survival knowledge gap are education, information, and practice. These 
three broad elements present what appear to be the keys to human survival (Campbell, 
2000; DeBecker, 1997; Frey et al., 2010; Gonzales, 2003, 2008; Hall, 2011; Kahneman et 
al., 1982; Keating et al., 1981; Latane et al., 1968; McLennan et al., 2011; NIST, 2009, 
2010; Pittman, 2012; Ripley, 2006, 2008; Schroll, 2002; USFA, 2002, 2011b, 2011c; 
VonAppen, 2012; Winerman, 2004). 
3. Bon Voyage 
As presented in the results section, cruise ships are required to present safety 
briefings to every passenger on board–or who may subsequently board–the ship, prior to 
leaving port. Is that due to the overwhelming loss of life that occurs due to cruise ship 
disasters every year? Of course not. The requirements behind such procedures arose 
mostly out of the sinking and loss of life of the General Slocum (1904), the Titanic 
(1912), the Lusitania (1915), and the Costa Concordia (2012). However, these most 
famous of shipwrecks–although they accounted for a combined total of 3,467 deaths–that 
number merely equals the over 3,000 U.S. fire-related deaths that occur every year in this 
country (United States Fire Administration, 2011b). They also are several hundred fewer 
than the approximately 4,700 work-related fatalities that occur in the U.S. every year 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Yet, with fewer than 200 fatalities on cruise ships 
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over the last four decades (Lipcon et al., 2013), the safety briefings that may save your 
life when you are out at sea are conducted at the beginning of every voyage.  
Conversely, over the same four decades, the U.S. has suffered over 3,000 hotel 
fires each year resulting in the loss of several hundred lives (Evarts, 2012). Yet, when we 
check in there is not even a mention of safety measures and we are left to our own 
devices.  
During the above research, it became clear to me that many more civilians are at 
risk of dying in hotel fires in the U.S. than on cruise ships. Considering the hotel fire and 
fatality statistics above, the potential for a catastrophic hotel fire in the U.S. may be just 
around the corner. It appears that having a hotel doorman or bellhop escort each guest to 
their room and give them a short safety briefing on the exit locations, smoke detector and 
sprinkler locations, and to point out the fire safety card found on the inside of every hotel 
room door for further information would be a basic fire prevention ordinance. 
Unfortunately, it is not. 
4. Trickle-Down Apathy 
Getting back to more general emergencies and disasters and teaching civilians 
how to save themselves, we just need to look at the auto industry and safety cultures. 
When the American public cannot be trusted to save themselves, the government steps in 
for them—at least that’s the story of mandatory car insurance, seat-belt laws and smoking 
bans (however, after Hurricane Katrina [2005], Irene [2011], and Sandy [2012], flood 
insurance has only been made mandatory for approximately 20% of U.S. homes that are 
at risk of floods [Ripley, 2006]). When it comes to preventing disasters, or taking 
measures to protect yourself, your family and your property, the rules are different. The 
message from the government is consistent: We will help you build where you should not 
build, we will come and rescue you when things go bad, and then we will help you 
rebuild again in the same location. One encouraging note to that story is that after 
personally experiencing a flood loss during Hurricane Sandy (while attempting to 
complete this thesis), I found that my neighbors who did not have flood insurance were 
forced to sign up for it before FEMA would consider them for disaster assistance. 
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It appears to me that generally, some politicians shy away from tough issues 
especially if they are unpopular. However, in the recent years in places like New York 
and New Jersey, the politico’s did speak frankly, sternly and in some instances 
threateningly, when describing the possible effects of Hurricane Irene (2011) and 
Hurricane Sandy (2012).  
In the wake of these two hurricanes and the devastation they caused, these same 
politicians had an opportunity to right some of the wrongs and to get homes out of the 
most vulnerable areas, or significantly alter them so they may remain. Only New Jersey 
has implemented new stricter hurricane construction and building codes in those areas. I 
have to question if that is enough. What about the federal government? Are the FEMA 
and the National Flood Insurance Program going to keep re-insuring and paying for 
homes that have been damaged or destroyed in flood zones in either one or both of the 
storms? At this point, it looks like they are. But why? FEMA and the federal government 
may need to take tough stances and perhaps provide monetary assistance so that we do 
not keep responding to the same disasters, in the same communities, year after year. 
5. Dissenting Opinions 
One difference of opinion from the mainstream research findings was that of the 
Australian government and emergency services. As pointed out by McLennan et al. 
(2011) while concluding their research on the Australian bushfires of 2009, they wrote, 
“When the primary strategy for community-based protection becomes one of removing 
people from the threatened locations, such a blanket approach may have unintended 
negative consequences” (p. 45). The researchers contend that those consequences may 
result in reducing the overall level of community knowledge and understanding about 
how to survive the impending disaster if they become entrapped. This approach alone 
offers no education on reducing risk and vulnerabilities. Nor does it address the 
possibility that the emergency services may be unable to reach those that are trapped in a 
timely manner.  
After living through Hurricane Sandy in New York on October 29, 2012, and as a 
first responder charged with protecting my members and having to conduct rescue 
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attempts for several people who ignored the mandatory evacuations, I can say that I agree 
with the researchers. McLennan et al. argue that the overemphasis on simply being 
somewhere else when the emergency occurs may not give people the knowledge of how 
to protect themselves and to make proper decisions. They liken this to the similarity of 
the “just say no” approach to sex education and drugs (p. 45). That approach offers no 
real insight into the hazards of indulging in either activity and they do not offer 
alternative solutions. McLennan et al., feel that the fire and emergency services may be at 
risk of promising, inadvertently, more safety than they can guarantee. It is my position—
as argued in this thesis—that if we equip the public with the knowledge (not simply 
information) and training of the skills they may need on how to act and what is important 
concerning given disasters, they may actually be better off when the emergency services 
cannot be there to help. Part of that information is also to evacuate immediately when 
told to do so.  
A second differing opinion found in the research was one presented by 
VonAppen, 2012. VonAppen relates a near-miss scenario where a group of experienced 
and well-trained firefighters were caught in a life-and-death struggle when they were 
overrun by flames, smoke and intense heat. VonAppen discusses that if the professionally 
trained firefighters in the scenario were not able to set aside their emotional responses 
and to safely remove themselves from this untenable situation, what chance would 
untrained civilians have under the same circumstance?  
I challenge this theory of civilians being unable to set aside their emotions to 
enable them to make better decisions. In the grave circumstances that these firefighters 
found themselves in they were equipped with protective gear that bought them precious 
seconds to make life-altering decisions. Civilians who would find themselves in a similar 
untenable position without the protection of that same gear would most likely have 
perished on the spot due to the superheated gases and thermal assault to their bodies and 
organs. Therefore, they would not have had the same opportunity, and the same kind of 




However, prior to that specific event, if a civilian had been in the same fire but in a 
different location within the structure that the firefighters were in, there may have been 
time (albeit limited) for them to make decisions to escape. 
The idea that humans may be unable to set aside their emotions during extremely 
life-threatening events is exactly contrary to my beliefs based on the research. If people 
can be educated as to what their likely reactions might be to life-threatening stressors 
they may be able to concentrate on decision making rather than their emotional reactions 
to what is going on around them and how they would like it to be. It has been said that 
emotions trump reason in emergencies. However, considering the experiences found in 
the literature review concerning having to make decisions under stressful conditions (as 
seen in the World Trade Center attacks), emotions may be subdued in lieu of 
concentrating on taking action, but only if they are rehearsed and thought about ahead of 
time. 
6. Community Up Reach 
Recognizing a connection between community outreach and information 
uploading, an idea emerged from the research about how to connect disaster management 
with the business and private worlds. The idea behind the Community Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) program has swept the nation after September 11, 2001. The 
program forms neighborhood teams of civilians who are taught basic skills to take care of 
themselves, their property, and their neighborhoods (in that order) in the event that the 
emergency responders are overwhelmed, unable to respond, or during those critical initial 
minutes when they are en route. The CERT program has proven successful in getting the 
word and training out to the communities, and arms them with information, education, 
and practice. Although it only reaches a dedicated small group of individuals, they are 
able to take what they have learned and pass it on to their family and neighbors. The 
structure of the program is one that can be adapted to educate office employees and 
homeowners alike. Today, with the availability of social media, computer-generated, 
scenario-based training aids and a willingness of employers to allow workers to train on 
“company time” (or to meet legislatively mandated requirements) may make this type of 
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emergency education readily accessible. The benefit to building owners, business owners 
and managers would be reduced insurance premiums, and the benefits of a better 
educated and well-rounded work force. The employees can take the information they 
learned home with them to practice. Now, when an emergency does occur in the 
workplace or at home, employees may be better equipped to handle it and either continue 
on at work or leave home to get to work sooner than they might otherwise be able to. A 
side benefit would be that employees might be less likely to need time off or away from 
their job if they can handle emergencies rather than needing someone else to handle it for 
them. 
7. To Evacuate or Not to Evacuate, That Is the Question 
One phenomenon that I witness time and time again in my line of work as a New 
York City firefighter is that Europeans generally tend to take fire alarms much more 
seriously than Americans. Responding to false alarms in hotels in my fire company’s 
response area is not uncommon. The Americans tend to stay in their rooms and wait to 
see if it is a false alarm or not, where the Europeans more often than not meet us in the 
lobby or the street. When I have asked those who evacuated about their attitude and 
actions, they say that in Europe the population is reminded about fire safety daily on 
television, radio and social media. Due to its history (primarily bombings of World War 
II and more recent terrorist attacks), Europe is more of a proactive and preventative 
culture compared with the U.S. concentration on reactionary response.  
Gershon et al. (2007) found that in the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 
11, 2001, factors that influenced individual evacuation included: perception of risk (from 
sensory cues), preparedness training, the familiarity of the building, physical condition, 
health status, footwear, and individual behavior, which was affected by group behavior 
and leadership. At the organizational level, evacuation was affected by worksite 
preparedness planning (individual offices and the WTC site), including the training and 
education of building occupants, and communicating risks to occupants. Still, over 3,000 
perished in those attacks, several hundred of them due to the fact that they didn’t 
evacuate immediately when they felt something had gone terribly wrong. Many 
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participants who delayed evacuation did so because they were unable to walk down 
stairs; they were unfamiliar with the building layout, stairwell locations, and termination 
points. Only a small number of people stated that company managers led the way out of 
the buildings (see Table 1). Gershon et al. surmise that environmental cues play a key 
role in risk assessment. People who are not exposed to obvious cues were more likely to 
delay evacuation, presumably because they did not feel an immediate threat. 
Additionally, Gershon et al. concluded that individual knowledge and organizational 
preparedness were important factors in evacuating.  
They also found that individual emergency experience could mitigate gaps in 
organizational preparedness and could, to some degree, compensate for individual 
preparedness deficiencies. Orientating high-rise occupants to building features and 
adding a plan for visitors and new employees are important for safety managers to 
address (p. 7). Once again, concurrent themes that represent the keys to survival were 
education, preparation and practice (See Table 2).  
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- Emergent cue perception. 
- Intuition. 
- Prior experience (WTC 
bombing, 1993). 
- Thought it a terrorist event. 
- Knew how to evacuate. 
- Low knowledge level of 
building/exits. 
- New to job/building. 
- Delaying behaviors. 
- Unsure of physical 
abilities. 
Organizational Factors 
- Instructed by person in 
charge. 
- Instructed by colleague. 
- Persuaded by authoritative 
voice. 
- No guidance provided. 
- Ambivalent/contrary 
messages provided. 
- New managers unsure of 
procedures. 
- PA announcements to 
stay or return to offices.  
Environmental Sensory 
Cues 
- Heard/saw/felt explosions. 
- Saw plane strike/flash of 
light. 
- Bldg. lights flickered. 
- Smelled/saw smoke/fuel. 
- Saw debris out of window. 
- Received no cues. 
- Communication failures. 
- Lack of communication. 
 WTC = World Trade Center, PA = Public Address System 
Table 1.   Key Factors Related to Initiation of World Trade Center Evacuations 
Clearly, education, and familiarization of employees and managers at the WTC 
played an important role in the saving of tens of thousands of lives on September 11, 
2001. I contend that the research provided herein demonstrates that information, 
education, and practice will save people’s lives in other, more common emergencies and 








Evacuation Progress Facilitators Barriers 
Individual 
- High rise fire safety 
training. 
- High building knowledge. 
- Good footwear. 
- Followed crowd. 
- Followed supervisor/leader. 
 - Encouraged to keep 
moving by 
others/firefighters.  
- Poor physical condition. 
- Low levels of safety 
knowledge. 
- Inappropriate footwear. 
Organizational 
- Good Management. 
behavior/directions. 
- Firefighters assisted with 
directions. 
- Encouraged to keep going. 
- Stopped when told to 
(PA) “All safe, return to 
office.” 
- Lack of directions out of 
building. 
Environmental 
- Strong cues witnessed. 
- Supportive group behavior. 
- Stairwells in good 
condition 
- Debris on stairs. 
- Smoke in stairs. 
- Crowds in stairs. 
- Slow moving people in 
stairs. 
- Locked doors on 
landings. 
- Debris in lobby. 
- Rare social 
disorganization. 
- Shoving in lobby to exit. 
Table 2.   Key Factors Related to Progression of Evacuation 
8. Political Will 
Dartanner (n.d.) discusses how some people who have never been personally 
affected by a natural disaster often decide (consciously or subconsciously) to not deal 
with the subject at all, and that can be a dangerous mistake. It occurred to me that 
politicians are no different from the general public when it comes to disaster 
preparedness. However, their constituents may not want to hear that. Not that the elected 
officials are above the law or expected to be less than human, but what they are expected 
to do is to be a manager and to take matters of the public (in this case safety 
preparedness) into consideration. Therefore, they need to be educated as well. Although 
many politicians are able to rely on emergency management professionals to make 
suggestions and take the lead in emergencies and disasters, the individual politician must 
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also be able to set aside their emotions and make critical decisions that may save 
countless lives. Accomplishing such goals should reasonably be accomplished through 
prearranged relationships, mutual respect, and understanding of roles and responsibilities. 
For emergency managers, taking advantage of teachable moments with politicians pre-
event is perhaps the best form of sharing information, education, and preparation. 
9. Conclusion 
Throughout the development of this thesis, I have learned a great deal. As with 
most research goals, I hope to have afforded the reader an opportunity to learn as well. 
The overall achievement threshold is to be able to positively affect the lives of others 
who will—at some point in their lifetime—find themselves faced with an emergency or 
disaster. With that sentiment, the research recommendations will be presented as an 
opportunity to educate, inform, and arm the general public with the necessary cognitive 
and psychomotor skills that may be required to help save themselves in emergencies and 
disasters.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through in-depth research and analysis, the thesis author has developed specific 
recommendations regarding the question of why do some people live and some people 
die in the same emergencies and disasters; and how the general public can be taught to 
improve their chances of survival. Although the scope of the recommendations are made 
specifically for the New York area, they can also be applied throughout the United States. 
To implement the following complex adaptive system thesis recommendations 
(a.k.a. strategy), a great deal of collaboration will be required. The key 
players/stakeholders to facilitate such recommendations have been identified as: the 
FDNY, specifically, the Fire Commissioner; Fire Prevention Bureau and Bureau of Legal 
Affairs; The New York City Mayor’s OEM; the New York City Council; federal, state 
and local lawmakers; private building owners; and the public at large who live and work 
within the boundaries of the City of New York. 
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The first problem with such an expansive list of required stakeholders would 
appear to be the successful convergence of such a multitude of resources. However, they 
are in fact already assimilated toward achieving such a common goal. One of the positive 
results of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was the adoption of New York 
City’s Local Law 26 of 2004 and the subsequent 2008 New York City Building & Fire 
and Life Safety Codes. Local Law 26 requires the Fire Commissioner to adopt standards, 
procedures, and requirements for the protection of occupants in certain office buildings in 
response to both fire and non-fire-related emergencies. Those emergencies could include 
explosion, biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, natural disaster, or the threat 
thereof, or a declaration of emergency by lawful authority. As mandated in the Local 
Law, the Fire Commissioner published Rule 6-02 of The Rules of The City of New York 
(3 RCNY 6-02), which requires that each office building subject to the requirements of 
the rule prepare a written Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Each EAP must meet a uniform 
and required format and must be submitted for approval to the FDNY within one year of 
when the law went into effect.  
The thesis recommendations present incremental innovations that simply expand 
on the previously acceptance of these specific laws. As such, these thesis 
recommendations will not have the same potential vulnerabilities to corporate and 
political agendas as most of them would encounter if presented today on their own. Each 
of the recommendations has been dealt with previously by all the identified stakeholders 
prior to the adoption of the existing laws.  
1. First Recommendation 
The first recommendation of this research is to amend current local legislation to 
require minimally accepted quantities of both written and hands-on fire and life safety 
training to all commercial building occupants in New York City. This would include new 
employees within a one-month period of being hired. Addendums to the RCNY 6-02 
should include annual drills on related topics, such as building emergency protection and 
detection systems, basic fire safety, emergency notifications, and stairwell 
familiarization.  
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The start of such addendum modifications to the RCNY 6-02 fall well within the 
legal purview of the Fire Commissioner and this recommendation will be forwarded to 
him for such purpose. One anticipated roadblock to this recommendation might be the 
reluctance of the Fire Commissioner to place additional burden on businesses and their 
employees. The arguments to push past this roadblock are self-evident. They are the same 
arguments that lead to the passing of Local law 26 and RCNY 6-02 in the first place: To 
provide education and practice drills to reduce the loss of life during fires, emergencies 
and other natural or manmade disasters. 
Local Law 26 and the RCNY 6-02 address many issues regarding commercial 
buildings including construction, demolition and abatement, building codes, and fire and 
life safety codes. They establish the designation and certification of Fire Safety Directors; 
EAP Directors and Deputy Directors; and Site Safety Manager/Site Fire Safety Directors. 
Each of these titles requires training and certification by the FDNY. Additionally, Fire 
Safety/EAP Fire Brigades consisting of Building Managers, Chief Engineers, and the 
Director of Security are all identified–by name–as responsible and integral parts of the 
EAP.  
In addition to developing procedures for sheltering in place, in-building 
relocation, partial building evacuation, and full-building evacuation, all of the above 
named individuals are responsible to train subordinates on the EAP and each of its phases 
of implementation. Those subordinates include Building Evacuation Supervisors, Fire 
Wardens on each floor, and Assistant Fire Wardens in each commercial office space. 
Therefore, the groundwork and working relationships (or complex predictive planning 
scheme) for the first strategic recommendation of this thesis is already previously 
established. The recommended addendums to the current laws are designed as a bridge to 
span the knowledge gap between the current law’s failure to address minimum training 
standards and time frames, and the realization of educating commercial building 
personnel and the occupants therein.   
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2. Second Recommendation 
The second recommendation of this research is to enhance the efforts of 
emergency responders in public education. An emergent and formalized strategy of 
education in the EAP coupled with insight into the lack of public understanding and 
perception is required on the part of emergency responders, specifically members of the 
FDNY. It is recommended that a realistic scenario-based lesson plan and course (of less 
than four hours) be developed within the FDNY Bureau of Training. The established 
training can be provided to each firefighter and fire officer during their respective Annual 
Education Day. The objectives of this training will include the understanding of EAP 
requirements and processes; a brief introduction into the psychological aspects of how the 
general public react in emergencies and disasters; and finally, the review of survival 
stories from office workers and building personnel who evacuated the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001. Additional case studies of high-rise commercial 
occupancy emergencies and disasters should also be included. 
a. Anticipated Arguments 
The arguments anticipated with this second recommendation might be the 
reluctance of firefighters to accept the responsibility of going out and educating the 
public. Firefighters may not fully understand the influence that their position generates 
among the general public. In reality, the very calling of firefighting and the public’s 
perception and respect of these individuals make the relationship ripe for cultivation. 
Further anticipated roadblocks might include the abundance of training items that 
compete for the firefighter’s time, as well as union issues if the training were performed 
on other than the scheduled Annual Education Day, or the perception of this 
responsibility as additional work that is to be compensated for.  
The fundamental responsibility of firefighters to perform fire prevention 
education would take care of the former anticipated argument, and the delivery of the 
aforementioned course on the scheduled Annual Education Day would quell the latter 
argument. 
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3. Third Recommendation 
The third and final thesis recommendation is to develop public/private 
partnerships to provide realistic information and scenario-based drills that the public can 
comprehend and participate in. Although leveraging the legal regulations and 
enforcement of Local Law 26 and RCNY 6-02 can help make this particular strategic 
plan somewhat resilient (not to mention a potential money maker for the city), it would 
not do anything positive to build a cooperative working environment with building and 
business owners or their stakeholders. An additional approach to legislation is the 
education component. It must be pointed out to businesses and building owners that the 
education of employees can, and has, saved hundreds of millions of dollars in direct and 
indirect business losses, in addition to limiting liability vulnerabilities. Each of these 
considerations affect the bottom line while at the same time limit loss of life.  
An anticipated consequence of this recommendation may be the receipt of 
significant reductions in insurance premiums that may be applicable through the very 
action of making the work environment safer for all employees. Additionally, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) mandates may also be ancillary 
concerns that can be overcome or corrected through employee education and an acquired 
state of safety mindfulness. 
a. Anticipated Obstacles 
One of the biggest obstacles of implementing the complex adaptive 
recommendations of this thesis recommendation is the time allotment required of the 
participants (employees). The RCNY 6-02 calls for the use of instructional drills, 
stairwell familiarization drills, or both. Although instructional drills can vary in design, 
length, and approach, they are meant to familiarize building occupants with the 
requirements of their particular building’s EAP. These requirements cost time, and to the 
business community–time is money. 
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b. Learn, Adapt, and Overcome 
To overcome these concerns, technological integration as part of the 
process is recommended. Incorporating the technology sections of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s (CHDS) Master’s 
Degree Program, readily available computer-based simulation and imagery programs can 
be utilized. The recommendation would require the employees/occupants to spend just 15 
minutes per week to log on and participate in given scenarios and make multiple-choice 
decisions based on the given situations, and receive immediate feedback on why a chosen 
decision was correct or incorrect. The additional option of looking at why the other 
optional decisions would have been more or less correct are excellent options to allow the 
adult learner to receive instant gratification, as well as valuable feedback. The one 
component that cannot be simulated (except for the stress of having to complete each 
scenario in a limited time frame) would be the fear factor of making the wrong life-or-
death decision. 
However, as shown in the research concerning immediate decision 
making, even if these decisions are wrong, they will buy time for the person to make 
additional and possibly more correct decisions. The hesitancy of making a decision until 
it is too late always limits the choices and, if an incorrect choice is made, there may be no 
time to recoup and make additional choices.  
Information technology departments can track the required participation, 
as well as the progress of the employees/occupants. Automatic email reminders can be 
sent out throughout the workweek to remind employees and managers of the required 
participation. Additional benefits are that the computer programs can rate and score 
employee decisions, show them possible consequences of both correct and incorrect 
choices, and track individual employee/occupant progress. 
Public/private partnerships can solve the dilemma of development (there 




and the issue of making them available to workers/occupants during working hours. 
Perhaps the cost of such training could be shared by the building owners, business 
owners, computer software companies, and insurance companies.  
Cost savings by allowing occupants to take the training at their 
convenience, and the use of Big Data to track training and individual progress would 
prove to be most beneficial of options. This leverage could also be used to pressure 
occupants to actually take part in the training and required EAP familiarizations. 
Additionally, the legal requirements and the associated documentation of all training 
would assist in making these innovations more attractive to the corporations that are 
required to use them. 
4. Future Research 
Recommendations for future researchers of this topic would be: (a) to perform 
direct interviews of emergency and disaster survivors. The focus of those interviews 
would be to see how, if at all, heredity, intuition, life experiences, preparedness 
education, individual preparedness (prior to the event) and their values and attitudes may 
have played a role in their survival; (b) To organize an educational curriculum for the 
public on general emergency planning; and (c) At the doctorate level, to provide an 
educational emergency preparedness program to a given audience (perhaps an office 
building or similar workplace) over a finite time period (say a matter of months so as to 
reach every office and every employee). Once everyone has been trained, perform a drill 
scenario–perhaps incorporating smoke machines, nighttime hours (for an element of 
unfamiliarity, stress, and discourse), and not allow the use of one or more normal exit 
routes (to present decision-making challenges)–then document the actions of the 
participants and document the results. Additionally, it may prove beneficial to perform 
the same scenario prior to the delivery of the training to gauge occupant improvement. 
(d) Work with local politicians and policy makers to positively affect the emergency 
preparedness of your community by enacting educational programs, drill requirements, 
and updated emergency action plan legislation.  
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E. SUMMARY 
Throughout the Literature Review and research Methods and Procedures, three 
common threads consistently emerged: (a) In most emergencies and disasters (but 
certainly not all), people who survived made a conscious decision to take immediate 
action; (b) In most instances, survivors had planned ahead or been mentally prepared to 
deal with emergent circumstances before they occurred; and (c) education in emergency 
actions and planning, the gathering of information, and clear communications all play a 
role in civilian survival. These three common themes directly correlate to the problem, 
purpose, and research question of this thesis—Why do some people live and some people 
die in the same emergencies and disasters, and can the general public be taught to save 
themselves? 
The organizational steps of this research were to compile and examine published 
literature on human reactions and decision making, and to then merge them into a 
singular discussion on the main research topic. The reason for selecting particular case 
studies and scientific research found within this thesis are the correlations shown between 
the science of human behavior and the reality of those behaviors in everyday, real world 
scenarios. 
Overall, the implementation strategy of this thesis is one of coordination, 
integration, and convergence. Coupling existing emergent technologies, laws, and 
current, formalized strategies, will be the keys to implementation success. The 
implementation plan will expand and grow as the recommendations are adopted and 
subsequently tested throughout the over 800 high-rise office buildings in the City of New 
York.  
Once it is understood why some people survive and some people die in the same 
emergencies and disasters, we can begin to take action against the prohibitive nature of 
the human condition. Identifying how and why people act or react the way they do allows 
us to work within those constraints to teach people how to overcome their inherited or 
acquired handicaps.  
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APPENDIX A. 
An overview of influential factors for phases 1 and 2 of the behavioral process 
(NIST, 2009) 
Factors Phase 1: 
Perception 
Phase 2: Interpretation  
of a fire of risk to 
self/others 
Occupant-based pre-event: 
Has experience with fires? (Yes) 
Has knowledge of fire training? (Yes) 
Habituation with environment? (Yes) 
Knowledge of evacuation route? (Yes) 
Experience with false alarms? (Yes) 
Feels secure in building? (Yes) 
Has perceptual disability? (Yes) 
Age (Older adult >25 years old)? (Yes) 
Female gender? (Yes) 
Speaks same language as others? (Yes) 





































Occupant-based event factors: 
Has a higher stress/anxiety level? (Yes) 
Perceives a time pressure? (Yes) 
Others (loved ones) present? (Yes) 
Proximity to fire/sees fire? (Yes) 
Sleeping? (Yes) 
High # of behavioral processes (>1)? 
(Yes) 





























A higher # of cues? (Yes) 
Receives consistent cues? (Yes) 
Unambiguous cues? (Yes) 
Social cues consistent with 
understanding a fire situation? (Yes) 
Official source? (Yes) 
Familiar source? (Yes) 
High dose of toxic gases? (Yes) 
Extreme/dense cues? (Yes) 
Visual/audible alarm cues? (Yes) 





































Areas where no research was found marked by “---”; conflicted research on direction of 
factor influence is marked by **.  
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APPENDIX B. 
Stephen Marsar’s Roadmap to Success 
 
        Started:  
        Completed:  
 
        
 
        Completed:   Completed:    
 
        Completed:  Started:  
 
        Started:       Completed:         Completed: 
       
       Started: 10/11   
             Started:  
             Completed:  
 
    Started:           Completed: 
 
         #1. Completed:         #2. Completed:    #3. Completed:         Completed:  
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APPENDIX C. 
Stephen Marsar Thesis Required Elements and Timeline 
 SECTION             TARGET DATE  COMPLETED   Advisor 1  Advisor 2   
1. Title Page   ________   
2. Executive Summary ________                                  
3. Introduction  ________   
 
4. Table of Contents  
         (Separate page)  ________ 
 
5. Main Body Sections         X        X 
Introduction  
(Separate page)  ________  
 
Background & Significance ________ 
 
Literature Review ________ 
Methods   ______ 
Results   ______ 
Discussion  ______  
Recommendations ______ 
6. Reference List  
(Separate page)  ______ 
7. Appendices   ______ 
(Separate pages as needed) 
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